An analysis of geopolitical mediation and hybrid warfare in Southeastern Europe

Abstract

This article argues that the concept of the “Serbian World” (“srpski svet”) functions as an intermediary structure for the projection of Russian strategic influence in the Western Balkans, creating a mid-level layer of influence between Moscow and the Balkan political space. Instead of a linear state-to-state relationship, a multi-layered architecture of influence is observed, where Serbia serves as a regional actor, while the Russian Federation functions as the ideological, normative, and strategic center.

Through a comparative analysis of Montenegro, Kosovo, and North Macedonia, the article identifies mechanisms of persistent hybrid competition operating through political elites, religious institutions, and media ecosystems, producing a form of “prolonged conflict below the threshold of war.”

1. Introduction: from territorial geopolitics to cognitive competition

The transformation of the international order following the expansion of the European Union and NATO in Southeastern Europe has produced a structural shift from classical territorial geopolitics toward cognitive geopolitics and narrative-based competition.¹

Within this framework, the Russian Federation operates through an indirect power projection model, where influence is not exercised through formal territorial control, but through the construction of political, identity, and informational dependencies.²

The Western Balkans emerges as a typical space of this model, where Serbia functions as a regional proxy node within a broader structure of Russian influence.

2. Theoretical framework: hybrid warfare as a system, not a strategy

The analysis is based on three interlinked theoretical pillars:

First, hybrid warfare as an integrated operational system, where military, economic, informational, and psychological instruments operate simultaneously.³

Second, the concept of proxy strategic governance, where regional actors function as executive layers of influence of a larger power.⁴

Third, ontological security, which explains how political identity becomes an object of strategic intervention.⁵

Within this framework, the “Serbian World” is not merely an ideological narrative, but a political infrastructure for translating Russian influence into the Balkan context.

3. The “Serbian World” as a discursive and instrumental structure

The concept of the “Serbian World” (“srpski svet”) must be understood as a political discourse with geopolitical function, aiming to create transnational spaces on ethno-cultural and religious bases.

According to the European Council on Foreign Relations, this concept shows structural homology with the “Russkiy Mir,” functioning as a normative mechanism for expanding influence beyond state borders.⁶

At a functional level, it produces four key strategic effects:

* delegitimization of the existing territorial order in the Balkans
* maintenance of the frozen conflict in Kosovo as a political instrument
* stabilization of structural tension in Bosnia and Herzegovina
* narrative synchronization with Russian anti-liberal discourse⁷

4. Political elites and narrative coherence

Aleksandar Vulin represents a key figure in the operationalization of this discursive structure.

His sanctions by the United States in 2023 should be interpreted as an institutional indicator of Western concern regarding structured influence networks, rather than an individual political measure.⁸

In this sense, Vulin functions as a strategic narrative entrepreneur, by:

* normalizing multipolarity as an alternative to the liberal order
* relativizing Russian aggression in Ukraine
* articulating discourses of selective sovereignty and anti-interventionism⁹

5. Montenegro: hybrid interference as a multi-dimensional process

The case of Montenegro represents a laboratory of sustained hybrid interference, where economy, religion, and informational operations intersect.

5.1 Economy as structural dependency

Russian capital has functioned as a form of state-influenced economic capture, creating political leverage in strategic sectors such as tourism and real estate.¹⁰

5.2 The 2016 events: logic of destabilization

The 2016 coup attempt represents a case of hybrid interference operation with direct geopolitical objectives, aiming at:

* preventing NATO integration
* altering the political balance
* eliminating Milo Đukanović¹¹

Investigative reporting suggests involvement of networks linked to the GRU and regional actors.¹² NATO StratCom defines this case as “hybrid escalation below the threshold of war.”¹³

5.3 Religious dimension as political infrastructure

The Serbian Orthodox Church has functioned as an institution of political and identity mobilization, extending beyond its traditional religious role.

During the 2019–2020 crisis, it became a de facto political actor, influencing institutional and narrative polarization in Montenegro.¹⁴

6. Kosovo: contested sovereignty and normative competition

Kosovo represents a contested sovereignty regime, where statehood status becomes an instrument of geopolitical competition.

Serbia uses this issue as a mechanism of internal political consolidation, while Russia uses it as an instrument to delegitimize the norms of the liberal international order.¹⁵

According to the International Crisis Group and NATO, northern Kosovo remains a zone of fragmented sovereignty and a high risk of continuous destabilization.¹⁶

7. North Macedonia: contested integration and information warfare

North Macedonia represents a case of Euro-Atlantic integration accompanied by structured counter-information campaigns.

The Prespa Agreement represents a moment of identity reconfiguration and institutional unlocking in relation to NATO.¹⁷

However, OCCRP and RFE/RL document the existence of disinformation networks targeting this process, while the EEAS classifies this as an advanced form of Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI).¹⁸

8. Synthesis: multi-layered architecture of influence

The comparative analysis reveals a clear hierarchical structure:

* Russia → strategic and normative architect
* Serbia → regional operational intermediary
* local actors → executors of narrative and influence

This model represents a decentralized influence system with high strategic coherence, characteristic of modern hybrid competition formats.¹⁹

9. Conclusion

The “Serbian World” should not be interpreted as an independent ideological project, but as an operational mechanism for projecting Russian influence in the Western Balkans.

In this sense, the statements and positions of actors such as Aleksandar Vulin do not represent rhetorical episodes, but empirical indicators of a broader architecture of hybrid warfare and geopolitical competition in Southeastern Europe.²⁰

Footnotes:

1. Galeotti, Mark. Hybrid War or Gibridnaya Voina? Getting Russia’s Non-Linear Military Challenge Right. NATO Defense College Research Paper No. 105, 2016.
→ Analyzes the Russian concept of hybrid warfare as a coordinated blend of military, informational, economic, and political instruments. Galeotti argues that Russia does not operate through linear conventional warfare, but through a “non-linear” conflict model in which the boundary between peace and war is deliberately blurred.

2. Hoffman, Frank G. “Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars.” Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, 2007.
→ Establishes the foundational framework for hybrid warfare as a contemporary conflict paradigm. Hoffman argues that state and non-state actors simultaneously employ conventional and irregular methods to achieve strategic objectives below the threshold of declared war.

3. Renz, Bettina & Smith, Hanna. “Russia and Hybrid Warfare – Going Beyond the Label.” Aleksanteri Papers, University of Helsinki, 2016.
→ Critiques the overuse of “hybrid warfare” as an analytical label and argues for deeper structural analysis of Russian operational practices rather than descriptive categorization.

4. Wendt, Alexander. Social Theory of International Politics. Cambridge University Press, 1999.
→ Provides the constructivist foundation for ontological security theory, arguing that state identities are socially constructed and therefore vulnerable to external discursive and normative influence.

5. Laruelle, Marlène. Russian Nationalism: Imaginaries, Doctrines, and Political Battlefields. Routledge, 2018.
→ Examines the evolution of Russian nationalism and the “Russkiy Mir” doctrine as an ideological framework combining cultural, religious, and political elements to justify Russia’s external influence.

6. European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR). “Russia in the Western Balkans: A New Phase of Influence?” Policy Brief, 2022.
→ Identifies the Western Balkans as an area of strategic entrenchment where Russia maintains influence through political, media, and economic networks, particularly via local intermediaries such as Serbia.

7. U.S. Department of the Treasury. “Treasury Sanctions Aleksandar Vulin and Related Network.” July 11, 2023.
→ Official sanctions document outlining alleged links between Aleksandar Vulin and Russian influence networks, transnational corruption structures, and activities undermining institutional stability in the Western Balkans.

8. Balkan Insight. “Who is Aleksandar Vulin and Why Was He Sanctioned?” 2023.
→ Investigative analysis of Vulin’s political career, his role in Serbian security institutions, and his ideological alignment with pro-Russian and anti-Western narratives.

9. Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). Russian Economic Influence in Montenegro. 2019.
→ Examines Russian capital penetration in Montenegro’s strategic sectors (tourism, energy, real estate), framing it as a form of economic statecraft that generates structural dependency and political leverage.

10. Special Prosecutor’s Office of Montenegro. Indictment: 2016 Coup Attempt Case. Podgorica, 2017.
→ Official judicial document detailing the investigation into the 2016 coup attempt, describing a coordinated scheme aimed at destabilizing Montenegro and preventing NATO accession.

11. The Guardian. “Montenegro Coup Plot and Alleged Russian Involvement.” 2016.
→ Investigative reporting on the attempted coup, including alleged involvement of Russian intelligence-linked networks and regional operatives.

12. The New York Times. “A Balkan Coup Attempt and Russia’s Shadow.” 2017.
→ Analytical article situating the Montenegro coup attempt within broader Russian hybrid warfare strategies, emphasizing proxy actors and plausible deniability mechanisms.

13. NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence (StratCom). Hybrid Threats in the Western Balkans. Riga, 2018.
→ Strategic assessment identifying the Western Balkans as a region exposed to hybrid threats, including information operations, psychological warfare, and political destabilization below the threshold of armed conflict.

14. Freedom House. Nations in Transit: Montenegro Report. 2020.
→ Documents democratic backsliding, political polarization, and external influence pressures affecting Montenegro’s institutional and societal stability.

15. Džankić, Jelena. “Religious Identity and Statehood in Montenegro.” Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, 2021.
→ Analyzes the role of Orthodox religious identity in state-building processes and tensions between Montenegrin national identity and pan-Serbian narratives.

16. International Crisis Group. Kosovo-Serbia Relations: Managing the Standoff. 2023.
→ Examines the frozen conflict between Kosovo and Serbia, highlighting escalation risks and the influence of external actors on regional stability.

17. NATO. Security Environment in Kosovo Reports. 2022–2024.
→ Ongoing assessments of Kosovo’s security environment, emphasizing northern Kosovo as a region vulnerable to political instability, organized crime, and external influence.

18. OCCRP (Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project). Russian Influence Operations in North Macedonia. 2017.
→ Investigative report documenting Russian influence networks in North Macedonia, including political financing and support for anti-NATO mobilization efforts.

19. European External Action Service (EEAS). Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI) Report. 2023.
→ Official EU report analyzing disinformation and foreign information manipulation campaigns in the Western Balkans, identifying coordinated influence networks.

20. Bechev, Dimitar. Russia’s Strategic Interests in the Balkans. Carnegie Europe, 2023.
→ Analyzes Russia’s strategic interests in the Balkans, including energy leverage, political influence, hybrid tools, and the use of Serbia as an indirect projection node.

The Land of Leka,14.05.2026