Brussels must view Serbia through the actions of its institutions, political structures, and policies that continue to relativize the crimes of the wars of the 1990s, glorify those convicted of war crimes, restrict the rights of minorities, and obstruct a genuine reckoning with the past.

The funeral and public honors for Ratko Mladić in Belgrade are a grave indication of the failure to break with the political and military legacy of the wars of the 1990s. Mladić was finally convicted by international justice for genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes and sentenced to life imprisonment.¹
Nevertheless, his figure continues to appear in the public sphere through honors and narratives portraying him as a hero. This is not merely a matter of the past. It is an indication of how part of Serbia’s political establishment continues to approach that past.

This reality cannot be treated as an isolated episode. European Commissioner for Enlargement Marta Kos cancelled her planned visit to Serbia following developments related to the glorification of Mladić.² The European External Action Service has stated that the glorification of war criminals, denial of genocide, and revisionism are contrary to the fundamental values of the European Union and have no place in candidate countries.³ These positions must be transformed into concrete policy towards Belgrade.

Serbia cannot continue to be treated as a European candidate gradually fulfilling the criteria for integration while its institutions and political actors tolerate a public culture in which war crimes are relativized and their perpetrators rehabilitated. The European Commission itself assessed Serbia’s situation in 2025 as being marked by deep polarization, pressure on civil society, excessive use of force against protesters, and stalled reforms; the Commission called for an urgent return to the reform path in justice, fundamental rights, and freedom of expression.⁴

Serbia’s international responsibility concerning Srebrenica is also part of a legal judgment by the International Court of Justice. In its 2007 judgment, the Court found that Serbia had violated its obligation to prevent genocide in Srebrenica and had breached its obligations by failing to transfer Ratko Mladić and by failing to cooperate fully with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia.⁵

This legal reality cannot be separated from the way the Serbian state and political establishment continue to treat figures associated with the wars of the 1990s. A state seeking EU membership must demonstrate through actions that it has moved from a policy of rehabilitating the past to a policy of accountability for it.

But the problem is not limited to war crimes. It is also reflected in the treatment of national communities and in the functioning of territorial democracy within Serbia.

Albanians in Preševo, Bujanovac and Medveđa continue to face serious problems in the effective exercise of their rights. The Advisory Committee of the Council of Europe on the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities has documented concerns raised by Albanian representatives regarding the so-called “address passive registration” practice. According to the Council of Europe’s assessment, passive registration may result in people being removed from the residents’ register and may prevent them from obtaining identity documents and, consequently, from participating in general elections or elections for national minority councils. The Committee has expressed direct concern and called on the Serbian authorities to prevent administrative practices that may restrict the exercise of minority rights.⁶

This issue carries particular weight in areas where Albanians constitute a significant part of the population. An administrative procedure affecting residents’ registration, personal documents and political participation cannot be treated as a technical matter. It directly concerns the exercise of civil and political rights.

Problems with the implementation of linguistic and cultural rights also affect other communities in Serbia. The Council of Europe continues to call for more effective implementation of standards concerning regional and minority languages, including the use of Albanian and Hungarian in administration, education and public services.⁷ The fact that, in 2025, the Council of Europe organized a dedicated roundtable in Belgrade on the implementation of recommendations concerning minority languages, including Albanian, demonstrates that the problem remains unresolved.⁸

In this reality, Serbia cannot present itself to Brussels solely as a strategic partner for regional stability. A candidate state must demonstrate that minority rights are implemented in practice, that institutions are not used to restrict political participation, and that the linguistic and cultural identity of communities is genuinely protected.

The same issue arises in relation to Vojvodina. The Constitution of Serbia recognizes the territorial autonomy of Vojvodina, while the Council of Europe has for years raised concerns regarding the actual implementation of its competences and financing. The Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of the Council of Europe has criticized the failure to implement constitutional provisions concerning the budget of the Autonomous Province of Vojvodina and has called for progress in decentralization and local democracy.⁹

This is not an insignificant administrative matter. Territorial autonomy, decentralization, local participation, and the protection of cultural diversity are part of European standards of democratic governance. Serbia cannot demand high standards for itself in its relations with the EU while applying lower standards within its own territory.

If Brussels wants to genuinely assess the degree of democratization in Serbia, it must also look at Preševo, Bujanovac, Medveđa and Vojvodina. It must look at how Albanians, Hungarians, Bosniaks, Roma, Croats, Romanians, Bulgarians, Slovaks, Roma and other communities are treated. It must examine how many rights exist only on paper and how many are actually exercised in everyday life.

This makes the European Union’s policy towards Belgrade even more important. Serbia should not be assessed solely through its statements in accession negotiations, but through the way its institutions function domestically. The rule of law, fundamental rights, minority protection, decentralization, and reckoning with the past are all part of the same European standard. The European Commission itself defines enlargement as a merit-based process and directly links the pace of accession to progress in democracy, the rule of law, and fundamental rights.¹⁰

In this context, Kosovo cannot be treated as an issue separate from Serbia’s conduct. The European Union has linked the normalization of Kosovo–Serbia relations to the European perspective of both sides. The Agreement on the Path to Normalisation and its Implementation Annex are part of this European political framework, while Serbia’s obligations have been incorporated into its accession process.¹¹

This means that the EU standard must be the same at the dialogue table and within Serbia itself. It is not enough for Belgrade to declare its readiness for dialogue in Brussels while pursuing domestic policies that produce discrimination, restrict the political participation of minorities, and preserve narratives glorifying the past.

A state seeking integration into the European Union cannot simultaneously pursue a European foreign policy and a domestic policy based on the relativization of war crimes, discrimination against minorities, and political centralization. It cannot seek the economic and political benefits of closer relations with the EU while, at the same time, tolerating the public rehabilitation of figures convicted of genocide and crimes against humanity.

This is where the real test for Brussels lies. If European statements concerning war crimes, genocide, minority rights, decentralization, and the rule of law remain merely statements, Belgrade will interpret them as a manageable cost. If they are accompanied by concrete conditions and political consequences, then the enlargement policy gains credibility.

Ursula von der Leyen’s visit to the Western Balkans places this issue at an important political moment. The European Commission has confirmed the regional visit, while the final programme and stops in each country remain part of the preparations.¹² The significance of the visit lies not only in the itinerary. What must be measured is Brussels’ political message to Belgrade.

The message must be unequivocal: the European perspective is not a licence to relativize war crimes, glorify those convicted by international justice, restrict minority rights, or weaken democratic autonomy and decentralization.

Serbia must confront its past not only through documents signed in Brussels, but through its institutions, public policy, education system, media environment, and the way the state treats war crimes, minorities, and autonomous institutions.

Brussels does not need more promises from Belgrade. It needs measurable results. It needs a policy that makes clear that closer relations with the European Union bring not only funds, markets and political benefits, but also irreversible responsibilities towards justice, human rights, democracy and European good-neighbourly relations.

The Balkans cannot build lasting peace on the rehabilitation of war criminals, discrimination against communities, and political centralization. Nor can the European Union build a credible enlargement policy while tolerating such a reality.

Therefore, Brussels must remain vigilant towards Belgrade. Not through general statements, but through concrete policy, clear conditions and measurable consequences. Serbia must understand that the road to Europe does not pass through glorifying the past, discriminating against minorities, and strengthening centralization, but through verifiable reforms and a clear break with the policies that have kept the region hostage for decades.

Europe must not reward denial with integration, revisionism with tolerance, or discrimination with silence. If Serbia wants to be part of Europe, it must meet Europe’s standards.

Footnotes,
1. International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals, Prosecutor v. Ratko Mladić, Appeals Judgement, 8 June 2021. The Mechanism confirmed the convictions for genocide, crimes against humanity, and violations of the laws and customs of war, as well as the sentence of life imprisonment.

2. Reporting on the cancellation of Commissioner Marta Kos’s visit to Belgrade and her response to the glorification of Ratko Mladić.

3. European External Action Service, statement by the spokesperson concerning Ratko Mladić and the EU’s position on the glorification of war criminals, denial of genocide, and revisionism.

4. European Commission, 2025 Enlargement Package, Serbia. The Commission identified deepening polarization, pressure on civil society, excessive use of force against protesters, stalled reforms, and the urgent need for progress in justice, fundamental rights, and freedom of expression.

5. International Court of Justice, Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment, 26 February 2007. The Court found that Serbia had violated its obligation to prevent genocide in Srebrenica and had breached its obligations to cooperate with the Tribunal, including by failing to surrender Ratko Mladić.

6. Council of Europe, Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, Fifth Opinion on Serbia. The document records the concerns of Albanian representatives regarding the “passivisation” of addresses in Bujanovac, Medveđa and Preševo and notes that passivisation may result in the loss of residence registration, difficulties in obtaining identity documents, and obstacles to participation in elections. The Committee expressed concern and called for the practice not to restrict the exercise of minority rights.

7. Council of Europe, European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages, monitoring documentation concerning Serbia and recommendations regarding the implementation of the linguistic rights of national communities.

8. Council of Europe, Implementation Roundtable on the Fifth Evaluation Report of the Committee of Experts of the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages in Belgrade, Serbia, 5 February 2025. The discussions included the use of Albanian and Hungarian by administrative authorities and the implementation of linguistic rights of other communities.

9. Council of Europe, Congress of Local and Regional Authorities, documentation concerning local and regional democracy in Serbia. The Congress has raised concerns regarding the implementation of constitutional provisions concerning the budget of the Autonomous Province of Vojvodina and has called for progress in decentralization and local democracy.

10. European Commission, 2025 Enlargement Package. The Commission establishes that the accession process is merit-based and that the pace of accession is directly linked to progress in democracy, the rule of law, and fundamental rights.

11. European External Action Service, Belgrade-Pristina Dialogue: Implementation of the Agreement on the Path to Normalisation and its Implementation Annex.

12. European Commission, daily press briefing of 7 September 2026 concerning Ursula von der Leyen’s visit to the Western Balkans and preparations for the visit programme.

Prishtina,08.09.2025