Russian Aircraft Flies Through NATO Airspace to Niš: Aid for Wildfires or a Strategic Message from Moscow?

NIŠ — On 19 August 2026, a Russian Il-76P aircraft belonging to Russia’s Ministry of Emergency Situations landed in Niš to take part in Serbia’s wildfire response operation. The aircraft had previously flown through Bulgarian airspace, with the flight authorized on humanitarian grounds. The Russian operation began on 20 August.¹
Technically, the mission was humanitarian.

Politically and strategically, however, the case deserves a much broader analysis.

Because the destination was not simply Serbia.

It was Niš.

And Niš is not an ordinary city in Russian-Serbian relations.

The Russian-Serbian Humanitarian Center is located there, established in 2012 and officially presented as a facility for responding to disasters, emergencies and fires.

But for years, this center has been the subject of attention from the United States and Western security circles.

The United States has said for years that the center could be used as a point for Russian intelligence, while Russia and Serbia have denied this.²

This is where one of the most important questions surrounding this development arises.

Should a structure be assessed only by the function officially assigned to it, or also by the capacity it can create for the state that built and supports it?

In the world of intelligence, this question is fundamental.

A structure can have a humanitarian, diplomatic, economic or cultural function and, at the same time, have value for intelligence gathering, establishing contacts, maintaining a presence on the ground or exercising political influence.

That does not mean that every humanitarian center is an intelligence facility.

But it would be equally naive to believe that intelligence services use only buildings with signs saying “intelligence service.”

Often, the opposite is true.

Camouflage is part of the very nature of intelligence operations.

Niš Is Not Simply an Airport

The importance of Niš comes from the combination of several factors.
The city is located in southern Serbia, relatively close to Kosovo.

Niš hosts permanent Russian-Serbian infrastructure.

State and military institutions also operate in the same area.

And Serbia is a country that, although it seeks membership in the European Union and cooperates with NATO in various areas, continues to maintain special political and military relations with Russia.

In 2017, senior U.S. official Hoyt Brian Yee made American concerns about the Russian-Serbian Humanitarian Center part of the discussion about Russian influence in the Balkans. He said Washington was particularly concerned not only about what the center was at that moment, but about what it could become if Russia were granted special status or immunity.²

This is more than a debate about a building.

It is a debate about the capacity of the Russian presence in the Balkans.

And that is precisely why the arrival of the Russian aircraft in Niš matters.

Russia was not creating a channel from scratch.

It was using a channel that has existed for years.

Humanitarian in Mission, Strategic in Context

The Russian aircraft may have had a very specific task: fighting wildfires.
That should not be denied.

But an operation can be humanitarian in function while simultaneously having political and strategic value for the state carrying it out.

In this case, Russia:
sent a state aircraft;
sent Russian personnel;
entered Serbian territory;
used a previously established channel of Russian-Serbian cooperation;
and operated from Niš.
At the same time, Serbia was demonstrating that it could request and receive direct assistance from Moscow.
That is a political benefit even if no covert activity was carried out.

Because influence is built not only through secret operations.

It is built through presence, relationships, institutions, personnel and political trust.

And What About the EU?

Here an important clarification is necessary.
It would not be accurate to say that the European Union had no mechanism to help Serbia.

Serbia, although it is not an EU member, can use the EU Civil Protection Mechanism.

On 22 August, after Serbia requested assistance, the EU sent four Black Hawk helicopters, 55 firefighters and 24 vehicles from Germany, as well as 69 firefighters and 15 vehicles from Romania.³

So the picture is more interesting.

Russia arrived first with its aircraft in Niš; later, the European mechanism was also activated.

This shows that Serbia was not isolated from European assistance.

But it also shows that the Russian channel remains functional and ready to be activated on the ground.

And that is what should concern NATO, the EU and, above all, the countries of the Balkans.

The United States: Concern About Niš Predates the Aircraft

It is important not to create the impression that American concern about Niš began with the August aircraft.
It did not.

It has existed for years.

Washington has raised precisely the question of whether the Russian-Serbian Humanitarian Center could serve as an important point of Russian presence in the region.

This is not the same as a statement that “the center has been publicly proven to be an operational Russian intelligence base.”

But neither is it an insignificant concern.

Because the United States was not discussing only humanitarian activity.

It was discussing the capacity that could be created if Russia obtained special privileges for its personnel.²

And this is precisely the type of concern that exists in counterintelligence:
not only “what is being done today?”, but also:
“What could be done from this infrastructure tomorrow?”

Russia and the “Dual” Model of Presence

The history of Russian intelligence services in Europe shows that Moscow has also used structures and identities that, at first glance, do not appear to be part of an intelligence apparatus.

One of the clearest cases was uncovered in the Netherlands.

In 2022, Dutch intelligence uncovered a GRU officer who was using a Brazilian identity and had attempted to enter the International Criminal Court in The Hague as an intern. The operation had been built over years and involved a false identity created to conceal his links to Russia and the GRU.⁴

This case is extremely significant for the discussion about Niš.

Because it shows that a person’s declared identity and actual function are not always the same thing.

And this is precisely why counterintelligence does not rely only on the documents a person publicly presents.

Norway: The “Brazilian” Who Was Caught in the Arctic

In October 2022, Norwegian authorities arrested a researcher at the University of Tromsø who presented himself as a Brazilian citizen.
Norway’s security service PST said it believed he was actually Russian and described him as an “illegal agent” — an intelligence operative who operates without an obvious official connection to the Russian state.⁵

The case is particularly interesting because it did not take place in an ordinary city.

It happened in the Arctic.

And the researcher worked precisely in an academic environment connected to northern issues.

This demonstrates another characteristic of modern intelligence:
the objective may be information, not necessarily a secret document.

Information about northern policy.
Infrastructure.
Capabilities.
Institutions.
People.
Relationships.
All of these can have value.

Albania: Gramsh

In August 2022, two Russian citizens and one Ukrainian citizen were detained in Albania after attempting to enter a military facility in Gramsh.
Albanian authorities said the three individuals had been detained in an incident near the military plant and that two Albanian soldiers had been injured while attempting to stop them. The facility had a history connected with the production and processing of weapons.⁶

This case is important for the Balkans because it shows that suspected intelligence-gathering activity is not merely a distant issue in Eastern Europe.

It has also affected Albanian territory.

And the target was a facility with a military character.

Kosovo: The North as a Counterintelligence Space

For Kosovo, the dimension is even more sensitive.
In August 2022, Kosovo authorities detained Russian citizen Daria Aslamova and accused her of links to Russian espionage. Kosovo’s Interior Minister said he had information that she had been involved in Russian military intelligence activities; Reuters noted that it could not independently verify those allegations.⁷

This distinction is important.

But the fact that Kosovo authorities treated the case within the framework of counterintelligence is itself part of the story.

At the same time, Interior Minister Xhelal Sveçla said that there were elements of Serbia’s BIA and Russia’s GRU in northern Kosovo and that authorities had encountered Russian citizens suspected of espionage who had been expelled.⁸

These are statements by Kosovo authorities and should be treated as such.

But they are important because they show that Pristina has regarded the suspected Russian presence in the north as a direct security issue.

Two Russian Officials Declared Persona Non Grata in Kosovo

In October 2021, Kosovo President Vjosa Osmani announced that two Russian officials had been declared persona non grata because of activities that, according to Kosovo institutions, threatened national security and the constitutional order.⁹
Russia rejected the decision and argued that the officials were accredited to UNMIK.¹⁰

So there are two versions.

But one fact remains:
Kosovo took concrete action against Russian representatives on security grounds.

This is not merely an academic debate.

It is counterintelligence in practice.

UNMIK: Another Case That Raises Questions

In May 2019, Russian citizen Mikhail Krasnoshchekov, a member of the UNMIK staff, was arrested by Kosovo authorities during an operation in Zubin Potok.
The case triggered a major political confrontation between Pristina, Moscow and the UN mission.

For the purposes of our article, however, it is important not to go beyond the evidence.

We should not write that “UNMIK had stationed a Russian spy” as an established fact.

But we can say something else:
a Russian citizen with international status had institutional access in one of the most sensitive areas of Kosovo.

And this is precisely why institutional access matters to counterintelligence.

If a person has access to the ground, contacts, information and institutions, that access itself can have value.

Europe: A Network Wider Than the Balkans

The Balkan cases are not isolated.
In Britain, a network of six Bulgarian nationals was convicted of spying for Russia.
The group had conducted surveillance and operations against targets that included journalists, dissidents and Ukrainian soldiers training at a U.S. base in Germany.¹¹

This case is important for another reason.

It shows that Russia does not need every operative to be a Russian citizen.

A network can use:
citizens of other countries, people with local histories, different identities and intermediaries.

This makes counterintelligence more difficult.

Germany: Military Information

In Germany, prosecutors accused an army officer of attempting to pass classified information to Russian intelligence.¹²
Germany is a particularly important target for Russia because of its role in NATO, its defense industry and its support for Ukraine.

Here another element of the Russian model becomes visible:
you do not necessarily need to penetrate a military base if you can penetrate the person who works inside it.

The War in the Shadows

Since the invasion of Ukraine, European countries have documented an increasing number of operations linked to espionage, sabotage, influence and intelligence gathering.
These operations have increasingly been described as a “shadow war.”

In this model, the boundary between peace and conflict becomes less clear.

We do not necessarily have tanks.

We may have:
an agent;
a drone;
a cyberattack;
a fire;
sabotage;
photography;
a person with a false identity;
a local intermediary;
a social network;
or an influence operation.
And this is precisely why a security analysis should not focus only on traditional military forces.

Drones: NATO’s Airspace Boundary

One of the most important developments of recent years has been the repeated incursions by Russian drones and other aircraft into the airspace of NATO countries.
NATO has documented violations of the airspace of Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, Poland and Romania by Russian drones and other aircraft during 2025. Following the September 2025 incursions, the Alliance established Eastern Sentry to strengthen the defense of its eastern flank.¹³

In 2026, NATO has continued to report incidents.

In June, Secretary General Mark Rutte said that a drone that had entered Latvian airspace had been intercepted and destroyed by French NATO aircraft. He described these incidents as dangerous and reckless actions by Russia.¹⁴

In May, NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander Europe, General Alexus Grynkewich, spoke about another drone incident and stressed that NATO’s defense system is designed to protect allied territory when incursions occur.¹⁵

And in July, NATO Deputy Secretary General Radmila Shekerinska said that during the month there had been repeated violations of airspace by Russian drones and aircraft.¹⁶

This is no longer merely an isolated incident.

It is a recurring problem.

Are These Provocations?
Not every incursion can be publicly proven to have been intentional.
Some may be the result of warfare, navigation, electronic interference or operational errors.

But from NATO’s perspective, this does not eliminate the risk.

Because even an unintentional incursion can cause:
a military response;
escalation;
miscalculation;
civilian casualties;
or a direct confrontation between Russian and NATO forces.
And if some incursions are intentional, they may also serve as a way to test the Alliance’s response times, sensors and decision-making.
That is why NATO is investing in counter-drone systems and detection capabilities. In July 2026, the Alliance announced that its members plan to invest more than $40 billion in counter-drone capabilities over the next five years.¹⁷

The Arctic: The Other Front

If NATO’s south and east face drones and air activity, the north is becoming one of the most important areas of competition with Russia.
In February 2026, NATO launched Arctic Sentry, a multi-domain activity aimed at strengthening security in the Arctic and High North. NATO directly linked it to increased Russian military activity in the region.¹⁸

The Arctic is much more than ice and remote territory.

It is a gateway to the North Atlantic.

Sea routes pass through it.

Communication cables are located nearby.

Energy infrastructure.

New maritime routes.

And areas where Russian submarines can operate under conditions that are extremely difficult to monitor.

NATO notes that Russia has increased its military activity in the Arctic, established a new Arctic Command, reopened or restored old Soviet bases and expanded military infrastructure in the region.¹⁹

Submarines: The War That Cannot Be Seen

An aircraft can be seen.
A drone can be detected by radar.
A tank can be photographed.

But a submarine can travel hundreds of kilometers beneath the surface without being seen.

That is why Russian underwater activity has become particularly important for NATO.
Internet cables.
Energy cables.
Pipelines.
Communications infrastructure.
All are part of national security.

And a submarine does not necessarily need to attack a cable to be important.

It can observe, map and study it.

In 2026, NATO is also expanding its capabilities for multi-domain surveillance in the Arctic and North Atlantic, including networked unmanned systems.²⁰

So the intelligence war is not fought only on land.

It is fought: under the sea.

Serbia and Russia: The Military Dimension

To better understand why Niš matters, the Russian-Serbian military relationship must also be examined.
Russia has been an important supplier to the Serbian Armed Forces.

The Serbian Ministry of Defense has documented that Russia donated six MiG-29 aircraft to Serbia, while other agreements included 30 T-72MS tanks and 30 BRDM-2MS armored vehicles.²¹

But the list does not end there.

The inventory and demonstrations of the Serbian military have included:
MiG-29;
Mi-35;
Mi-17;
T-72MS;
BRDM-2MS;
Pantsir-S1;
Kornet;
and other systems linked to Russian supplies or cooperation.²²

At a demonstration of Serbian forces in Niš, T-72 tanks, Pantsir systems, MiG-29s and Mi-35 helicopters were displayed alongside other Serbian and Western systems.²³
This is important because it shows that the Russian-Serbian military relationship is not merely political.

It has materialized in real equipment.
In aircraft.
In tanks.
In air-defense systems.
In anti-tank missiles.
In helicopters.
And in training.

But Serbia Is Not Simply a “Russian Army”

Here too, exaggeration should be avoided.
Serbia is not a Russian military satellite.
It has purchased and continues to purchase systems from other countries.
It has relations with France.
It cooperates with China.
It operates Western systems.
It has its own defense industry.

So Serbia is trying to maintain a policy of military diversification.

But this does not eliminate the fact that Russia remains an important part of its military architecture.

And this is particularly important for Kosovo.

Why Does This Matter for Kosovo?

Because Kosovo is at the point where several strategic interests intersect. On one side is NATO.

KFOR is the international force that guarantees security on the ground.

On the other side is Serbia, which does not recognize Kosovo’s independence.

And behind Serbia stands Russia as a political supporter of Belgrade on the Kosovo issue.

In this context, any expansion of Russian capabilities in Serbia deserves attention.

Not because it automatically means Russia is preparing for war.

But because military capability and influence capability are two things that must be continuously monitored.

Russia Does Not Need to Enter Kosovo to Influence Kosovo

This is a very important distinction. Russia can influence Kosovo without sending soldiers.

It can do so through:
political support for Serbia;
diplomacy;
propaganda;
information operations;
cyber operations;
influence networks;
intelligence;
contacts with local actors;
and its presence in Serbia.
Therefore, the question is not only: “Will Russia enter Kosovo?”

The more realistic question is:
“How much capacity does Russia have to influence a crisis around Kosovo without being physically part of it?”

That is much more important.

From the Balkans to Australia

The Russian model of activity does not stop in Europe.
In Australia, in 2024, espionage allegations were raised against a couple of Russian origin, while in August 2026 Australian authorities arrested Russian-Australian citizen Vladimir Teslov, accused of attempted foreign interference and of passing sensitive Ukrainian military information to people he believed were linked to Russian intelligence.²⁴

This case is still before the courts and the allegations should not be treated as proven guilt.

But it demonstrates one thing:
the geographic reach of Russian counterintelligence concerns is not limited to the borders of Europe.

And in the Netherlands?

The case of Sergey Cherkasov is even more significant. He used a Brazilian identity and a life history constructed over years in an attempt to enter the International Criminal Court.

The objective was access to an institution investigating crimes connected with the war in Ukraine.²⁵

This is a classic example of what intelligence services call “deep cover.”

A person does not present himself as Russian.
He does not present himself as a diplomat.
He does not present himself as military personnel.
He creates another life. Another nationality.
Another history.
Another profession.
And for years builds credibility.

This is why we cannot assess a structure or person solely by the official label attached to them.

This Is Why the Issue of Niš Must Be Raised

When we look only at the aircraft, we have a firefighting mission.
When we look at Niš, we have a Russian-Serbian center.

When we look at Serbia, we have a state with special ties to Moscow.

When we look at the Serbian military, we have a long history of Russian arms supplies.

When we look at Kosovo, we have an unresolved political conflict in which Russia supports Belgrade.

When we look at Europe, we have numerous cases of espionage and sabotage.

When we look at NATO, we have repeated violations of its airspace by Russian drones and aircraft.

When we look north, we have the Arctic and Russian activity on land, at sea and under the sea.

When we look at the world, we have Russian intelligence operations from the Netherlands and Norway to Australia.

And then Niš no longer looks like an isolated episode.

It looks like a point within a much larger map.

The Issue Is Not to Declare Niš a “Spy Base”

That would be a very weak way to construct the argument.
Because it would create a single point that an opponent could dismiss with the question:
“Where is the evidence?”

The stronger argument is different.

The United States has expressed documented concern about the possibility that the center could be used by Russia for intelligence.²

Russia and Serbia deny this.

At the same time, the world has seen how Russian intelligence services have used false identities, institutions, local networks, foreign nationals, cyber operations and various structures to collect information.

Therefore, the possibility cannot be dismissed simply because the center’s official function is humanitarian.

And precisely for that reason, it should be monitored.

A Humanitarian Center Can Also Be a Strategic Asset

There is no contradiction in this.
A structure can genuinely be humanitarian and simultaneously have strategic value.

In the case of Niš, that value may come from:
location.

personnel.
contact with Serbian institutions.
links to Moscow.
the repeated presence of the Russian state.
access to a region near Kosovo.

And above all:
the ability to quickly activate a Russian state channel on Serbian territory.

The August aircraft demonstrated precisely this capability.

What Should Concern NATO?

Not just one aircraft.
Not just one center.
Not just one drone.
Not just one submarine.

But the combination of all of them.

A Russia using different tools to exercise influence.

At the same time:
in the air;
at sea;
under the sea;
in cyberspace;
in diplomacy;
in the media;
in intelligence;
and through local networks.
This is why NATO is increasing its presence on the eastern flank, strengthening air defense, building Arctic Sentry and investing in counter-drone capabilities.¹³ ¹⁷ ¹⁸

And What Should Concern Kosovo?

Kosovo should not react with panic.
But neither should it react with naivety.

A Russian firefighting aircraft is not a military threat to Kosovo.
A humanitarian mission should not be treated as a military operation without evidence.

But the network that makes Russian presence in Serbia possible is a different matter.

And that network exists.
There are political relations.
There is military cooperation.
There is infrastructure.
There are institutional contacts.
There is a history of suspected intelligence activity in the region.

And there is a center in Niš about which the United States has raised concerns for years.

This is why Kosovo should follow the development seriously.

Conclusion

The Russian Il-76P aircraft may have arrived in Niš for an entirely humanitarian reason. And it may have done exactly what it was sent to do: fight wildfires.

But a humanitarian operation does not exist in a strategic vacuum.

It takes place in a city where Russia has a permanent Russian-Serbian structure.

It takes place in a state that maintains special ties with Moscow.

It takes place in a region near Kosovo.

It takes place at a time when NATO is facing increased Russian activity in the air, at sea, under the sea and in cyberspace.

And it takes place after years of cases in which Russian intelligence services or people suspected of being connected to them have been discovered using false identities, photographing sensitive facilities, collecting military information or attempting to penetrate international institutions.⁴ ⁵ ⁶ ¹¹ ¹² ²⁴ ²⁵

Therefore, the issue of Niš should not be framed in an overly simplistic way:
“Was the Russian aircraft a spy operation?”

We have no public evidence to say that.

The more important question is:
“What capacity does Russia’s permanent presence in Niš and Serbia give Moscow, and what opportunities could this create in a future crisis in the Balkans?”

That is the question that deserves an answer.

Because intelligence services do not build their capabilities at the moment a crisis begins.

They build them much earlier.

With people.
With contacts.
With institutions.
With infrastructure.
With information.
With political relationships.
And with a presence on the ground.

That is why Niš should be viewed not merely as the place where a Russian aircraft landed.

It should be viewed as a point within a network.

A network stretching from Belgrade and Niš toward northern Kosovo, from the Balkans into Europe, from NATO airspace toward the Baltic and Black Sea, and from the North Atlantic all the way to the Arctic.

Russia does not need to deploy tanks in Niš to have influence in the Balkans.

It only needs to have the capacity to be there when it is needed.

And the aircraft of 19 August demonstrated that the channel exists.

Humanitarian in mission. Strategic in context.

And that is precisely why the Niš case deserves far more attention than a news story about an aircraft that came to fight fires.

Footnotes,
¹ Reuters, “Serbia turns to Russia to help fight wildfires,” 20 August 2026. Reuters reports that a Russian Emergencies Ministry IL-76P firefighting aircraft landed in Niš on 19 August and began operations on 20 August. Reuters also reported that Russian aircraft are generally prohibited from European airspace under sanctions, while humanitarian assistance is exempt.

² Voice of America, “US Sees Russia’s ‘Humanitarian Center’ in Serbia as Spy Outpost,” 15 June 2017. The report describes U.S. concern over the Russian-Serbian Humanitarian Center in Niš and cites then-U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Hoyt Brian Yee’s concerns regarding the potential role of the center and the privileges Russia was seeking for its personnel.

³ Reuters, “EU sends helicopters, firefighters to Serbia to tackle wildfires,” 22 August 2026. Reuters reports that Serbia requested assistance through the EU Civil Protection Mechanism and that the EU was sending four Black Hawk helicopters, 55 firefighters and 24 vehicles from Germany, and 69 firefighters and 15 vehicles from Romania.

⁴ Dutch intelligence and Dutch government reporting on Sergey Cherkasov, the Russian GRU officer who used a Brazilian identity and attempted to enter the International Criminal Court in The Hague. The case has been publicly documented by Dutch authorities and intelligence reporting as an example of a Russian intelligence officer operating under a false identity.

⁵ Norwegian Police Security Service (PST), reporting on the arrest in October 2022 of a Russian national presenting himself as a Brazilian researcher at the University of Tromsø. Norwegian authorities identified him as a suspected Russian “illegal” intelligence operative.

⁶ Albanian authorities / international reporting, August 2022, concerning the detention of two Russian citizens and one Ukrainian citizen near the military facility in Gramsh, Albania, after an incident involving attempts to enter or photograph the facility. The incident resulted in the detention of the three individuals and injuries to Albanian soldiers who intervened.

⁷ Reuters, August 2022, reporting on the detention of Russian citizen Daria Aslamova by Kosovo authorities and allegations by Kosovo officials concerning possible links to Russian intelligence activities. Reuters noted that it could not independently verify the allegations.

⁸ Statements by Kosovo Interior Minister Xhelal Sveçla, concerning alleged activities of Russian and Serbian intelligence structures in northern Kosovo and the presence of Russian citizens suspected by Kosovo authorities of intelligence activity.

⁹ Office of the President of Kosovo, October 2021, announcement concerning the declaration of two Russian officials as persona non grata on national-security grounds. Kosovo authorities stated that their activities represented a threat to Kosovo’s national security and constitutional order.

¹⁰ Russian diplomatic statements, October 2021, rejecting Kosovo’s decision against the two Russian officials and stating that they were accredited to the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK).

¹¹ Crown Prosecution Service / UK authorities, 2024, concerning the conviction of six Bulgarian nationals for espionage activities on behalf of Russia. The case involved surveillance and intelligence-related activities in the United Kingdom and elsewhere in Europe, including activity directed at journalists, dissidents and Ukrainian personnel.

¹² German federal prosecutors, 2023–2024, concerning the German military officer accused of passing classified information to Russian intelligence. The case was brought before German courts and concerned alleged attempts to transmit sensitive military information.

¹³ NATO, 2025–2026, statements and official material concerning Russian drone and aircraft incursions affecting the airspace of NATO member states, including Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, Poland and Romania, and NATO’s subsequent strengthening of the eastern flank through Eastern Sentry.

¹⁴ NATO, June 2026, statement by Secretary General Mark Rutte concerning a Russian drone entering Latvian airspace and being intercepted and destroyed by French NATO aircraft. Rutte characterized such Russian actions as dangerous and reckless.

¹⁵ NATO, May 2026, statements by Supreme Allied Commander Europe General Alexus Grynkewich concerning Russian drone activity and NATO’s ability to respond to incursions into allied airspace.

¹⁶ NATO, July 2026, statement by Deputy Secretary General Radmila Shekerinska concerning repeated violations of allied airspace by Russian drones and aircraft.

¹⁷ NATO, July 2026, announcement concerning increased Allied investment in counter-drone capabilities, including plans by NATO members to invest more than $40 billion in counter-drone systems over the following five years.

¹⁸ NATO, February 2026, announcement of Arctic Sentry, a NATO multi-domain activity designed to strengthen security in the Arctic and High North in response to the changing security environment and increased Russian military activity.

¹⁹ NATO, official material concerning Russian military activity in the Arctic, including the establishment of a new Arctic command structure, restoration and expansion of military facilities and increased Russian military capabilities in the High North.

²⁰ NATO, 2026, information concerning the Alliance’s expansion of multi-domain surveillance capabilities in the Arctic and North Atlantic, including the use and integration of unmanned systems for maritime and underwater monitoring.

²¹ Serbian Ministry of Defence, official material concerning military cooperation with Russia, including the transfer of six MiG-29 aircraft to Serbia and agreements concerning 30 T-72MS tanks and 30 BRDM-2MS armored vehicles.

²² Serbian Ministry of Defence / Serbian Armed Forces, official material and military inventories documenting Russian-origin or Russian-supplied systems operated by Serbia, including MiG-29 aircraft, Mi-35 and Mi-17 helicopters, T-72MS tanks, BRDM-2MS armored vehicles, Pantsir-S1 air-defense systems and Kornet anti-tank missile systems.

²³ Serbian Ministry of Defence, reporting and imagery from Serbian military demonstrations in Niš showing T-72 tanks, Pantsir systems, MiG-29 aircraft and Mi-35 helicopters among equipment displayed by the Serbian Armed Forces.

²⁴ Australian authorities, August 2026, concerning the arrest of Russian-Australian citizen Vladimir Teslov on allegations of foreign interference and attempts to obtain or transfer sensitive information connected with Ukrainian military capabilities. The allegations remain subject to judicial proceedings and should not be presented as established guilt.

²⁵ Dutch authorities and intelligence services, reporting on Sergey Cherkasov and his attempted penetration of the International Criminal Court in The Hague using a Brazilian identity. The case has been publicly documented as an example of Russian intelligence using a long-term false identity and “deep-cover” methods to obtain access to an international institution.

The Land of Leka,22.08.2026