Kosovo cannot remain hostage to the five EU member states that do not recognize its independence. If Europe fails to offer an equal prospect, Albanians have the right to open a new debate about their political, national, and strategic future.

Introduction

1. A Moment That Calls for Strategic Reconsideration

Critical statements by Dutch Member of the European Parliament Thijs Reuten regarding the continued shelving of the Republic of Kosovo’s application for European Union membership have once again brought a fundamental issue into focus: the relationship between the principles proclaimed by the European Union and the manner in which those principles are implemented in institutional and political practice.

Kosovo’s case is no longer merely a problem concerning enlargement procedures. It is also a test of the credibility of European policy, the consistency of democratic standards, and the European Union’s ability to act as a political entity committed to its own principles.

Kosovo applied for EU membership on 15 December 2022. Nevertheless, the process has not advanced to the stage of receiving a formal opinion from the European Commission on its application. The Commission has stated that it stands ready to prepare such an opinion once requested to do so by the Council.

This situation requires more than diplomatic statements. It calls for an institutional response and a clear strategy for the future.

The question is straightforward: How long should Kosovo continue to base its strategic orientation on a prospect that has no clearly defined institutional timetable?

Kosovo’s European orientation is its own political and strategic choice. However, this does not mean that Kosovo should relinquish its right to consider other alternatives if the European path continues to remain blocked.

2. The European Union and the Contradiction Between Principles and Practice

The European Union was founded upon the principles of democracy, the rule of law, respect for human rights, equality, and cooperation among states.

Its enlargement policy is one of the principal instruments for promoting these values across the continent.

Nevertheless, Kosovo’s case exposes a problem that cannot be overlooked: the distinction between the formal criteria for integration and the reality of political decision-making within the EU.

Kosovo is expected to continue implementing reforms, strengthening the rule of law, improving institutional performance, and aligning its policies with European standards. These requirements are legitimate and must be fulfilled.

However, the European Union also bears responsibility for ensuring transparency and predictability in the enlargement process.

An integration prospect cannot rest solely on political declarations while institutional progress remains undefined.

If enlargement is a merit-based process, the assessment of those merits must take place through institutional mechanisms and clearly established criteria.

The EU cannot demand full institutional credibility from aspiring countries without demonstrating that its own decision-making is grounded in transparency, consistency, and predictability.

3. The Five Non-Recognizing EU Member States and the Institutional Blockade

One of the most significant obstacles to Kosovo’s European prospects is the non-recognition of its independence by five EU member states: Spain, Greece, Cyprus, Romania, and Slovakia.

This reality has a direct impact on the political and institutional dynamics of integration.

A legal distinction must be made: a member state’s non-recognition of Kosovo does not, in itself, constitute a formal decision rejecting its application. Nevertheless, EU accession requires unanimity within the Council and ratification of the accession treaty by all contracting states in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements.

This is established by Article 49 of the Treaty on European Union.

Consequently, a genuine structural problem exists: the positions of the non-recognizing states can influence the integration process, even when other European institutions express support for Kosovo’s advancement.

However, this does not eliminate the possibility or the need for intermediate institutional steps.

The European Commission can prepare its opinion on Kosovo’s application if requested to do so by the Council. The assessment process should be clearly distinguished, as far as possible, from political disagreements concerning recognition of Kosovo’s independence.

Therefore, Brussels should examine the available institutional possibilities to prevent internal disagreements from blocking every further step by Kosovo.

At the same time, the five non-recognizing states should provide a political explanation of how they envisage Kosovo’s European future and whether they are prepared to allow an objective assessment process to proceed.

4. The European Parliament and the Responsibility of the Council of the EU

An important development is the European Parliament’s resolution on the European Commission’s report on Kosovo, adopted on 17 June 2026.

The resolution was adopted with 412 votes in favour, 174 against, and 58 abstentions.

The European Parliament reaffirmed its support for Kosovo’s European perspective and called for institutional steps to advance its application, including a request for the European Commission to prepare an opinion on the merits of the application.

At the same time, Parliament emphasized the need for continued reforms in the rule of law, the protection of fundamental freedoms, and the fight against corruption.

This position represents an important political signal, but it should not be confused with a decision on accession or with a decision that automatically obliges the Council to take the requested steps.

Institutional responsibility remains divided among European institutions and member states.

Therefore, the question is this: If the European Parliament expresses support for Kosovo’s advancement, why is that support not being translated into concrete steps by the institutions responsible for the relevant decisions?

Europe must demonstrate that its enlargement policy is not merely a repeatedly expressed diplomatic declaration, but an institutional process involving responsibility and measurable results.

5. Kosovo’s Responsibility: Reforms Are Not Negotiable

Criticism of the European Union must not serve as an excuse for Kosovo’s domestic shortcomings.

On the contrary, the more strongly we demand equal treatment from European institutions, the greater our responsibility becomes to build functional and democratic institutions.

Judicial independence, the fight against corruption, the professionalization of public administration, the protection of community rights, and the functioning of constitutional institutions are obligations arising from the very nature of a democratic state.

These reforms should not be implemented solely because Brussels demands them.

They must be implemented because they serve the interests of citizens and the state.

However, the EU must also remain consistent in applying its own principles.

If it demands high democratic standards, it must ensure that the enlargement process does not become an instrument of political conditionality without a clear horizon.

If it demands the rule of law, it must support decision-making based on established criteria and procedures.

If it demands normalized relations between Kosovo and Serbia, it must ensure that dialogue is not used to undermine the sovereignty and constitutional order of the Republic of Kosovo.

The normalization of relations must lead to a comprehensive, legally enforceable agreement grounded in respect for sovereign equality.

6. The Albanian Space: A National Reality That Requires a Shared Vision

Albanians live across several states in the Balkans, yet political and territorial divisions have not erased their common historical, linguistic, cultural, and national identity.

Albania and Kosovo represent the two Albanian states, while Albanians in North Macedonia, Montenegro, the Preševo Valley, and Chameria constitute important parts of the broader Albanian national space.

Each of these areas has its own historical, political, and legal characteristics.

In North Macedonia, the Albanian issue concerns institutional representation, civic equality, the use of the Albanian language, and the implementation of guaranteed rights.

In Montenegro, the protection of identity, political representation, and the development of Albanian-inhabited areas remain important elements of interstate relations and minority rights.

In the Preševo Valley, the rights of Albanians, institutional representation, and equal treatment must remain a continuing priority of international diplomatic engagement.

Chameria, meanwhile, represents a distinct chapter in Albanian history.

The Cham issue concerns the displacement of the Albanian population, the loss of property, cultural heritage, identity, and demands for addressing historical consequences in accordance with international law and international human rights mechanisms.

This issue requires serious diplomatic engagement, historical documentation, and dialogue with Greece.

A Europe that places the protection of human rights and cultural heritage at the foundation of its political identity must also be willing to address unresolved historical issues.

Beyond these individual questions, however, Albanians need a common strategic vision.

This vision can begin with Albania–Kosovo economic integration, institutional coordination, educational cooperation, and the development of infrastructure, energy, and a common market.

Furthermore, more advanced models of political and institutional cooperation may be examined, always in accordance with the democratic will of citizens and the respective constitutional orders.

An economically developed and institutionally coordinated Albanian space should not be perceived as a project directed against other peoples.

It should be a project of development, security, democracy, and regional stability.

7. The Project of the United States of Albania Within the United States of America

At this point, a much broader strategic debate emerges.

Should Albanians limit their future exclusively to the prospect of European integration, or should they also examine other possibilities for political organization and international integration?

One idea that deserves consideration in public, academic, legal, and diplomatic debate is the project of establishing the United States of Albania, with the potential objective of voluntary union within the United States of America.

This idea is not presented as an existing agreement with Washington, nor as an announced American policy, nor as an arrangement that could be implemented automatically.

It is presented as a political and strategic proposal for discussion.

Its essence would be the examination of a new institutional model in which the democratic will of Albanian citizens would determine whether there is support for such a project, while its implementation would depend on international negotiations and constitutional approval by the United States.

Such a project would have to be based on several fundamental principles:

First: Democratic self-determination.

Any change in political status must be based on the free will of citizens, expressed through democratic processes and referendums organized in accordance with the relevant constitutions and legislation.

Second: Constitutional legitimacy.

The process must have a legal foundation in every state or territory involved. The will expressed through a referendum must be followed by the necessary constitutional and institutional procedures.

Third: Diplomatic negotiations with the United States.

Following the establishment of a democratic mandate, representative institutions could submit an official platform to the United States administration and Congress, requesting consideration of the legal possibility and modalities of such integration.

Fourth: International agreements.

Issues concerning sovereignty, territory, citizenship, civil rights, property, security, institutions, the economy, and political representation would have to be negotiated.

Fifth: Compliance with American constitutional procedures.

Article IV, Section 3 of the United States Constitution establishes that the admission of new states into the Union rests with Congress. The same provision also establishes the requirement for the consent of the relevant legislatures and Congress in cases involving the union of existing states or parts of them.

Consequently, such a project would require a dedicated process of negotiations and constitutional approvals, taking into account the legal status of each territory involved.

Sixth: Equality and the protection of all citizens.

Any potential model must guarantee equal rights, functioning democracy, property protection, individual freedoms, and security for all communities, regardless of ethnicity, language, or religious affiliation.

This is an issue that requires in-depth legal and constitutional study, but it should not be excluded from discussion merely because of its complexity.

8. The Referendum and Democratic Will: From an Idea to a Political Mandate

A referendum would be the principal instrument for expressing democratic will, but it must be organized on a clearly established legal basis.

Simply announcing a referendum politically is not sufficient.

There must be relevant legislation, constitutional authority, transparent procedures, independent oversight, public information, and guarantees of free voting.

If citizens expressed support for this project, the result would constitute a democratic mandate for representative institutions to open negotiations and seek its implementation.

Such a mandate would not mean that the United States would be obliged to accept the proposal. Acceptance would require American political consent and compliance with its constitutional procedures.

Likewise, the inclusion of territories that currently form part of other states cannot be achieved solely through a unilateral referendum. It would require lawful solutions, agreements, and the consent of the relevant parties.

These distinctions do not weaken the project. On the contrary, establishing them from the outset places the debate within a serious legal and diplomatic framework.

9. Obstacles Are Not Reasons to Abandon a Political Project

A project of this magnitude would naturally face political, diplomatic, legal, and constitutional obstacles.

This is understandable.

However, there is a fundamental distinction between respecting procedures and abandoning a political objective.

Obstacles must be addressed through dialogue, negotiations, diplomacy, international agreements, and democratic mechanisms.

If a procedure requires legislative amendments, they must be examined through the competent institutions.

If international agreements are necessary, they must be negotiated.

If approval from American institutions is required, institutional dialogue with them must take place.

If objections arise from the states involved, they must be addressed peacefully and in accordance with international law.

No obstacle should be overcome through force, but neither should procedural difficulties be used as a reason to avoid seriously examining a democratic political project.

Determination in objectives does not mean rigidity in diplomacy.

On the contrary, a serious project requires flexibility in negotiations, legal professionalism, institutional patience, and democratic perseverance.

The aim is not to impose the will of one people upon another. It is to create opportunities for citizens to decide their future within the boundaries of legality and international law.

10. The United States and the Euro-Atlantic Strategic Partnership

The relationship between Albanians and the United States of America has a distinct historical and strategic dimension.

American support was decisive in the processes that led to Kosovo’s liberation and independence.

For this reason, any debate concerning the strategic future of Albanians must take into account the importance of relations with Washington.

Regardless of whether the United States of Albania project is ultimately considered feasible, cooperation with the United States should be deepened in the fields of security, defence, the economy, investment, technology, and diplomacy.

Nevertheless, a distinction must be made between a strategic partnership and constitutional integration.

A partnership can develop through bilateral agreements and institutional cooperation. Integration into the American federation, however, would require an entirely different legal and political process.

This is why the proposal must be treated seriously, without creating the impression that an American offer exists or that there is a guaranteed path towards its realization.

Such a project first requires debate and study, followed by democratic legitimacy and, if the necessary conditions emerge, international negotiations.

11. The Message to the European Union: Albanians Have the Right to Consider Alternatives

The European Union must understand that Kosovo’s European prospects cannot rest solely on promises without a timetable.

We do not ask the EU to admit us by force. We do not demand that accession criteria be bypassed, nor do we deny member states their right to make decisions in accordance with the treaties.

However, the EU cannot expect Albanians to wait indefinitely and abandon the consideration of other strategic alternatives.

If Europe is unable to offer a credible, equal, and predictable perspective, then it is legitimate for a broader debate to begin in Kosovo and throughout the Albanian national space concerning the political and institutional future.

This debate should include Albanian economic integration, institutional coordination, strategic cooperation with the United States, and the possibility of examining a broader project of voluntary union within the United States of America.

This is not a threat against Europe.

It is not an ultimatum directed at any state.

It is a matter of the right to discuss the future and consider alternatives through democratic means.

The EU has the right to determine its own accession conditions. Albanians have the right to discuss, examine, and democratically decide their strategic orientation, while respecting the rights and obligations arising from the international order.

Conclusion

12. From Political Waiting to Responsibility for the Future

Kosovo’s position and its European prospects must be viewed within a broader historical, political, and strategic context.

Kosovo has chosen a European and Euro-Atlantic orientation. This orientation should continue to form part of its political debate and foreign policy.

However, strategic orientation must not become permanent dependence on the decisions of external institutions.

Albanians have the right to discuss their future, develop advanced mechanisms of national cooperation, and examine other models of political and institutional integration.

The idea of the United States of Albania within the United States of America is a proposal that requires open debate, legal study, constitutional analysis, diplomatic assessment, and, above all, democratic will.

It is not a project that can be realized through declarations, but neither is it an idea that should be excluded from discussion solely because of the potential difficulties involved.

Ultimately, the question is not whether Europe should be forced to admit Kosovo. It cannot be forced to do so.

The question is whether Albanians should consider their future limited to a single path of integration, regardless of the obstacles and uncertainties that may arise.

Answering this question requires a mature and inclusive national debate.

We cannot force Europe to admit us, but neither can we accept that our future remain hostage to Europe’s endless political indecision.

If Europe demonstrates that it is willing to offer an equal partnership, Kosovo and Albanians have every reason to continue along the European path.

If that prospect fails to materialize, we must be prepared to examine other alternatives through democratic processes, international agreements, and constitutional procedures.

Consistency in principles, determination in objectives, flexibility in diplomacy, and uncompromising respect for the rule of law.

This must be the foundation of every project concerning the future.

FOOTNOTES

1) European Union, Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union, Article 49, Official Journal of the European Union, C 202, 7 June 2016, p. 43.

2) European Commission, Kosovo* 2025 Report, Commission Staff Working Document, SWD(2025) 752 final, Brussels, 4 November 2025.

3) European Commission, 2024 Communication on EU Enlargement Policy, COM(2024) 690 final, Brussels, 30 October 2024. See also: Republic of Kosovo, Application for European Union Membership, formally submitted to the Czech Presidency of the Council of the European Union, Prague, 15 December 2022.

4) European Parliament, 2025 Commission Report on Kosovo, Resolution adopted on 17 June 2026, Procedure 2025/2252(INI), Document A10-0166/2026, adopted text T10-0220/2026.

5) European Parliament, Fact Sheets on the European Union, The Western Balkans – Kosovo, section on Kosovo’s European integration prospects and the five EU Member States that do not recognize its independence.

6) United Nations, Charter of the United Nations, 26 June 1945, Chapter I, Articles 1 and 2, concerning self-determination, sovereign equality, and the peaceful settlement of international disputes.

7) International Court of Justice, Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, 22 July 2010, General List No. 141.

8)United States of America, Constitution of the United States, Article IV, Section 3, Clauses 1 and 2, concerning the admission of new states into the Union and the formation of new states.

9) Council of Europe, Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, European Treaty Series No. 157, Strasbourg, 1 February 1995.

10) Miranda Vickers, “The Cham Issue: Albanian National and Property Claims in Greece,” Südosteuropa, Vol. 51, Nos. 4–6, 2002, pp. 228–249. See also: Eleftheria K. Manta, “The Çams of Albania and the Greek State (1923–1945),” Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, Vol. 29, No. 4, 2009, pp. 523–535.

Prishtina,08.11.2026