The Western Balkans remain an area where European security requires continuous attention. The historical experience of the region, its geostrategic position and the profound changes in Europe’s security environment make it necessary to pursue an approach that combines diplomacy, defence capabilities, regional cooperation and international mechanisms of deterrence.

It is within this framework that cooperation in the field of defence between Kosovo, Albania and Croatia should also be viewed.

On 18 March 2025, in Tirana, the ministers responsible for defence of the three countries signed a Joint Declaration on strengthening cooperation in security and defence. The document aims to increase security and stability in South-Eastern Europe and the Adriatic-Ionian region, develop defence capabilities, cooperate in the defence industry, conduct training and exercises, enhance interoperability and address emerging threats, including hybrid threats.[1]

But one element of the document must be emphasised from the outset: the declaration does not create new international or intergovernmental legal obligations between the three states.[2]

This provision is important for understanding the agreement as it is, rather than as it may be politically interpreted.

This is not about creating a new military alliance, but about a mechanism for cooperation in the fields of defence and security.

And this distinction is fundamental.

Security through cooperation

Contemporary security is not built solely through the number of soldiers, armoured vehicles or weapons systems.
It is built through professional institutions, training, planning, communication, technology, logistics, cyber defence, defence industry and the ability of armed forces to operate together in crisis situations.

In this context, interoperability is one of the fundamental concepts of modern security.

An armed force is not assessed only by what it possesses, but also by its ability to communicate, plan and operate in a coordinated manner with its partners.

The Kosovo–Albania–Croatia Declaration places precisely this logic at the centre of cooperation: the development of capabilities, training, exercises, defence industry and interoperability, alongside addressing hybrid threats and other security risks.[3]

This is not an unusual approach in today’s Europe.

On the contrary, it is part of the way modern states build resilience and deterrence capabilities.

Kosovo and the Euro-Atlantic orientation

For Kosovo, the importance of this cooperation is even greater.
Albania and Croatia are members of NATO, while Kosovo is not yet a member of the Alliance. For Pristina, the Euro-Atlantic orientation constitutes one of the pillars of its security policy.

The Tirana Declaration directly links trilateral cooperation with Kosovo’s Euro-Atlantic perspective and with support for its inclusion in regional security and defence initiatives.[4]

This should be understood within the logic of integration and deterrence, not confrontation.

A state that aspires to integrate into a collective security system must build professional institutions, credible capabilities, appropriate standards and the ability to cooperate with partners.

This is precisely where an important part of the strategic value of Kosovo’s cooperation with Albania and Croatia lies.

Kosovo should not be merely an object of the security architecture.

It should increasingly become a participant and contributor to it.

KFOR and NATO: the international pillar of security in Kosovo

Any serious analysis of Kosovo’s security must take into account NATO’s role.
KFOR has been present in Kosovo since June 1999. According to NATO, its mandate is based on United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244 and the Military-Technical Agreement.[5]

Resolution 1244, adopted on 10 June 1999, authorised the deployment of the international civil and security presences in Kosovo and defined their responsibilities. The Security Council acted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.[6]

NATO emphasises that KFOR continues to contribute to maintaining a safe and secure environment and freedom of movement for all people and communities living in Kosovo.[7]

In June 2026, NATO also announced that, taking into account the improvement in the security situation, it would gradually adjust KFOR’s posture during the following year.[7]

This is a development that should be read with caution.

It shows that KFOR’s posture is not static, but is adjusted according to assessments of the security situation.

At the same time, the development of domestic security capabilities should not be viewed as being in opposition to the international presence.

Professional domestic institutions and an international presence can be two complementary pillars of a preventive security system.

One builds domestic capacity.

The other provides an international mechanism for security and deterrence.

International law and defence capabilities

Every serious security policy must be grounded in international law.
Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter establishes that states shall refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.[8]

At the same time, Article 51 recognises the inherent right of individual and collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs.[8]

Here, an important distinction must be made:

defensive capability is not, in itself, proof of an aggressive intention.

Military training, the development of communications systems, cyber defence, equipment modernisation and cooperation between armed forces may serve precisely to prevent conflict.

In this sense, defence is not built by waiting for a crisis.

It is built before the crisis, so that the crisis does not occur.

A cooperation declaration is not a military alliance

For precisely this reason, any exaggeration in describing the Kosovo–Albania–Croatia agreement should be avoided.
The North Atlantic Treaty is an international treaty that creates a specific system of collective defence.

Article 3 establishes that the parties will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.[9]

Article 4 provides for consultations among the Allies when the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of them is threatened.[9]

Article 5 establishes the principle of collective defence in the event of an armed attack.[9]

The Tirana Declaration does not have this character.

It does not create a mechanism equivalent to Article 5 and does not establish an automatic obligation of joint defence.

On the contrary, the document itself establishes that it does not create new international or intergovernmental legal obligations.[10]

Therefore, from a legal perspective, this is structured cooperation in defence and security, not the creation of a new military alliance.

This distinction should be maintained in every serious debate.

Hybrid threats and the new security reality

European security in the 21st century is not determined solely by conventional military power.
A state may face cyberattacks, sabotage of critical infrastructure, interference in democratic processes, information manipulation, disinformation campaigns and other forms of influence.

In its 2022 Strategic Concept, NATO identified the Russian Federation as the “most significant and direct threat” to the security of the Allies and to peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area.[11]

This is an official strategic assessment of the Alliance, not a formulation that should be replaced with political rhetoric.

In its subsequent documents, NATO has also identified hybrid threats attributed to state and non-state actors, including propaganda, deception, sabotage and other non-military methods that may target political institutions, public opinion and the security of citizens.[12]

For this reason, a state’s response cannot be military alone.

It must also be institutional, technological, cyber and informational.

A secure state must be capable of protecting not only its territory, but also critical infrastructure, communications systems, public institutions and the information space.

This is part of modern defence.

Deterrence is not militarisation

One of the most common misconceptions in security debates is the automatic equation of strengthening defence with militarisation.
But deterrence operates according to a different logic.

NATO describes itself as a defensive alliance and links its security to a credible posture of deterrence and defence, supported by conventional, nuclear and missile-defence capabilities, complemented by capabilities in space and cyberspace.[13]

Within this logic, the purpose of defensive capability is to convince potential adversaries that the use of force would carry unacceptable costs.

In other words, deterrence seeks to make war less likely.

This is why the development of defence capabilities should not be analysed only through the question “how many weapons are being purchased?”, but also through questions such as:

Does it increase the ability to prevent a crisis?
Does it increase institutional professionalism?
Does it improve communication?
Does it strengthen resilience against hybrid threats?
Is international law respected?
Is there democratic oversight?
Does transparency increase?
These are the questions of a modern security policy.

Transparency as an instrument of stability

In a region with a complex security history, the strengthening of defence capabilities should be accompanied by transparency.
This is an established principle of European security.

The OSCE Vienna Document on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures is one of the key instruments of this approach. It contains measures relating to the exchange of military information, military activities, notifications, observation and other mechanisms aimed at increasing confidence and predictability.[14]

The OSCE considers military transparency, openness and information exchange to be tools for increasing military stability and predictability.[15]

This is particularly important for the Balkans.

Transparency does not weaken defence.

In many cases, it makes defence more credible.

In the face of political pressure: more institutions, not more rhetoric
When an external power interprets regional cooperation in the field of defence as a factor of tension, the most sustainable response should not be a competition of statements.
It should be based on documents.

On international law.

On verifiable facts.

And on the principles of collective security.

Kosovo has an interest in developing its security institutions and capabilities.

Albania and Croatia have the right to cooperate with Kosovo within the framework of their agreements and commitments.

NATO continues to play a central role in Kosovo’s security through KFOR.

And states have the right to cooperate in the field of defence, in accordance with international law and their obligations.

These are not arguments that require harsh language.

They are arguments that stand on documents.

Kosovo should be part of the security architecture

For Kosovo, the strategic challenge is greater than a single declaration.
It concerns building a state with institutions capable of ensuring security, managing crises and contributing to European security.

This requires investment in people, military professionalisation, education, technology, cyber defence, intelligence, logistics, defence industry and democratic oversight.

But it also requires diplomacy.

Because the objective of a responsible defence policy is not to create conflict.

It is to prevent it.

This is why Kosovo’s alignment with Euro-Atlantic standards should not be viewed solely as a military project.

It is an institutional project.

It is a security project.

It is a state-resilience project.

And, above all, it is part of the effort to make Kosovo a more capable, more credible and better prepared partner, able to contribute to regional security.

Conclusion: security through responsibility

The Balkans do not need a new language of division.
They need a more mature security culture.

This culture must be based on several fundamental principles: respect for international law, strengthening defence capabilities, military transparency, democratic oversight, regional cooperation and Euro-Atlantic integration.

For Kosovo, this means continuing to build its security institutions and deepening cooperation with partners.

For Albania and Croatia, it means continuing to contribute to a more stable security environment and to supporting Kosovo’s Euro-Atlantic perspective.

For NATO, it means continuing its policy of deterrence, defence and stability.

And for the region, it means that security should not be measured by the fear we create in one another, but by our ability to prevent a crisis before it becomes a conflict.

Ultimately, one principle should remain clear:

Defence cooperation is not, in itself, a threat. Uncertainty becomes a threat when institutions, transparency and mechanisms of deterrence are absent.
Therefore, strengthening Kosovo’s capabilities, cooperation with Albania and Croatia, and an increasingly strong connection with the Euro-Atlantic security architecture should be viewed as part of a responsible security policy.
Not as preparation for conflict.
But as preparation to prevent it.

Footnotes:

[1] Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Albania, Joint Declaration following the meeting between the Minister of Defence of the Republic of Albania, the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Defence of the Republic of Croatia, and the Minister of Defence of the Republic of Kosovo, Tirana, 18 March 2025. The document establishes the objective of strengthening trilateral cooperation in security and defence, increasing security and stability in South-Eastern Europe and the Adriatic-Ionian region, as well as cooperation in addressing emerging challenges, hybrid threats and other risks. Official text of the Joint Declaration – Ministry of Defence of Albania

[2] Ibid. In its final provisions, the Declaration establishes that the document does not create new international or intergovernmental legal obligations between the three states. This wording is decisive for determining the legal nature of the document and distinguishes it from a treaty or agreement creating binding international obligations.

[3] Ibid. The Declaration provides for cooperation in the development of defence capabilities, defence industry, training, exercises, interoperability of armed forces, and addressing hybrid threats and other security risks. Official text of the Joint Declaration – Ministry of Defence of Albania

[4] Ibid. The Declaration includes support for Kosovo’s Euro-Atlantic perspective and its inclusion in regional security and defence initiatives. This element places the cooperation within the broader framework of Euro-Atlantic integration and the development of Kosovo’s capabilities. Official text of the Joint Declaration – Ministry of Defence of Albania

[5] NATO, NATO’s role in Kosovo, updated 12 June 2026. NATO states that KFOR has been present in Kosovo since June 1999 and that its mandate is based on United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244 (1999) and the Military-Technical Agreement. NATO – NATO’s role in Kosovo

[6] United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1244 (1999), S/RES/1244, 10 June 1999. The Resolution authorises the deployment of the international civil and security presences in Kosovo and defines their responsibilities. The Resolution was adopted on 10 June 1999 with 14 votes in favour, none against and one abstention. United Nations Digital Library – Resolution 1244 (1999)

[7] NATO, NATO’s role in Kosovo, updated 12 June 2026. NATO emphasises that KFOR contributes to maintaining a safe and secure environment and freedom of movement for all people and communities in Kosovo. In June 2026, NATO also announced the gradual adjustment of KFOR’s posture during the following year, taking into account the improvement in the security situation. NATO – NATO’s role in Kosovo

[8] United Nations, Charter of the United Nations, San Francisco, 26 June 1945, particularly Articles 2(4) and 51. Article 2(4) establishes the obligation of states to refrain from the threat or use of force in international relations; while Article 51 recognises the inherent right of individual and collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs. United Nations – Charter of the United Nations

[9] NATO, The North Atlantic Treaty, Washington, D.C., 4 April 1949, particularly Articles 1, 3, 4 and 5. The Treaty establishes the obligation to settle disputes peacefully, the development of individual and collective defence capabilities, the mechanism of consultation among Allies and the principle of collective defence. NATO – The North Atlantic Treaty

[10] Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Albania, Joint Declaration Albania–Croatia–Kosovo, 18 March 2025, final provisions. The document expressly establishes that the Declaration does not create new international or intergovernmental legal obligations between the three states. Official text of the Joint Declaration – Ministry of Defence of Albania

[11] NATO, NATO 2022 Strategic Concept, adopted at the Madrid Summit on 29 June 2022. The document establishes the Alliance’s strategic environment, its three core tasks — deterrence and defence, crisis prevention and management, and cooperative security — and identifies Russia as the “most significant and direct threat” to the security of the Allies and to peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area. NATO – 2022 Strategic Concept

[12] NATO, Countering hybrid threats, updated 29 January 2026. NATO describes hybrid threats as activities that may target political institutions, public opinion and the security of citizens, including propaganda, deception, sabotage and other non-military methods. NATO – Countering hybrid threats

[13] NATO, Deterrence and defence, updated 25 June 2026. NATO describes itself as a defensive alliance and links its deterrence and defence posture to a combination of nuclear, conventional and missile-defence capabilities, complemented by capabilities in space and cyberspace. NATO – Deterrence and defence

[14] OSCE, Vienna Document 2011 on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures, Forum for Security Co-operation, 22 December 2011. The document contains confidence- and security-building measures in the politico-military dimension, including information exchange and mechanisms of transparency, notification and verification. OSCE – Vienna Document 2011

[15] OSCE, Vienna Document. The OSCE considers the Vienna Document to be one of the important instruments of the European security architecture, aimed at increasing military predictability and stability through transparency, verification and information exchange. OSCE – Vienna Document and the Forum for Security Co-operation

KEY LEGAL, INSTITUTIONAL AND STRATEGIC REFERENCE DOCUMENTS

1. The foundational document of the cooperation
Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Albania, Joint Declaration Albania–Croatia–Kosovo, Tirana, 18 March 2025. The primary document concerning the nature, objectives and areas of trilateral cooperation. Official text of the Joint Declaration

2. The foundational document concerning NATO’s role in Kosovo
NATO, NATO’s role in Kosovo, updated 12 June 2026. An institutional source concerning the mandate, mission and developments of KFOR. NATO – NATO’s role in Kosovo

3. The international basis of KFOR’s mandate
United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1244 (1999), S/RES/1244, 10 June 1999. The foundational Security Council document concerning the deployment of the international civil and security presences in Kosovo. United Nations Digital Library – Resolution 1244 (1999)

4. NATO’s strategic document
NATO, NATO 2022 Strategic Concept, Madrid, 29 June 2022. Establishes the strategic environment, core tasks and security directions of the Alliance for the coming decade. NATO – 2022 Strategic Concept

5. The document on deterrence and defence
NATO, Deterrence and defence, updated 25 June 2026. A key source concerning the concept of deterrence, collective defence and the resilience of the Alliance. NATO – Deterrence and defence

6. The legal foundation of the international order
United Nations, Charter of the United Nations, San Francisco, 26 June 1945, particularly Articles 2(4) and 51. United Nations – Charter of the United Nations

7. The founding treaty of NATO
NATO, The North Atlantic Treaty, Washington, D.C., 4 April 1949, particularly Articles 1, 3, 4 and 5. NATO – The North Atlantic Treaty

8. The military transparency document
OSCE, Vienna Document 2011 on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures, 22 December 2011. A reference document for transparency, predictability and confidence-building measures in the politico-military field. OSCE – Vienna Document 2011

9. The document on hybrid threats
NATO, Countering hybrid threats, updated 29 January 2026. A source concerning the definition and response to hybrid threats against institutions and societies. NATO – Countering hybrid threats

The Land of Leka,14.08.2026