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Nine years of zigzags. Rise and fall of a symbol

AIM Tirana, May 18, 1999

In more than a week’s time after he disembarked in Rome, Rugova has shaken hands with D’Alema, Schroeder, Blair, Chernomyrdin, and the Pope, but not yet with a million of his people evicted from their ancestral land of Kosovo. Apparently, it was easier for the Gandhi of the Balkans to explain his mysterious history with Milosevic to his Western partners than to his deported people.

Now NATO’s nightly air strikes on Yugoslavia and the endless columns of refugees seem to belong to what may be called the war routine. Albania, which without being too much mistaken may be considered a huge refugee camp and, at the same time, a giant NATO base, has grown accustomed to planes ceaselessly flying over its territory and long trains of refugees streaming towards its borders. The “struggle for Rugova” is now replacing the “struggle for Kosova” on the first pages of the newspapers and on the TV screens.

The Story …

The road to Tirana has always been difficult for Ibrahim Rugova. Squeezed between two rival political camps, he has been misunderstood on many occasions. On other occasions, he has been exploited politically, or has simply been led astray.

On his first visit to Albania in the spring 1991, only some months after the fall of communism, Rugova was received with all the honors by Albania’s last communist leader, Ramiz Alia, but this did not impede him from openly expressing his support for the anticommunist opposition. So much so that when he paid a visit to the cemetery of the Martyrs of the Nation, Rugova did not condescend to cast a glance at the grave of Enver Hoxha, the former Stalinist dictator, which won him the broad sympathy of the opposition and the visceral hostility of the communist diehards.

Later on, in the spring 1992, almost at the same time, Berisha in Tirana and Rugova in Pristina became President of Albania and “President”of Kosovo respectively. And although the West never officially recognized Rugova as president, the duo Berisha-Rugova were the pampered couple that had succeeded in ingratiating itself with the West, the United States especially. The press communiques routinely released from the President’s Office in Tirana after each Berisha-Rugova monthly meeting contained the ever-repeated phrases about “the unity of views of the two presidents”. This was perhaps the period when Rugova had no objection to coming to Tirana and even spending his holidays on the Albanian Adriatic beaches.

However, the decline in the popularity of his friend Berisha with the Albanian public could not be without consequences for Rugova, either. Rugova’s participation in the meetings organized by Berisha during his campaign for the Constitutional referendum in the autumn 1994 could not fail to bring about a deep split in Rugova’s relations with the Albanian opposition, which was becoming ever more critical of the authoritarian regime of the obstinate President. The rejection of Berisha’s Constitution, for which Rugova had also campaigned, was an indirect blow for the Kosovar leader,too. So much so that, in an interview with the Kosovar weekly “Zêri”, a leader of the Albanian opposition had to remind Rugova that “he should not forget that he would have to come to Albania even when Berisha was no longer in power”.

It seems that, apart from other things, Rugova in Pristina and Berisha in Tirana had in common what Nietztsche would have called “the will to power”. The Kosovar leader behaved in a Gandhi-like manner more outside than inside his inner circle. He was very harsh on his internal political opponents in Kosova. The moderate Kosovar leader was not half so moderate when he had to deal with those who criticized him. The alliance of “the two presidents” provoked “the alliance of the two oppositions” both in Tirana and Pristina.

American criticism of the May 1996 elections in Albania put Berisha in a difficult position. It is probable that at this time the USA might have advised its darling Rugova to keep his distances from Berisha whose power was neither strong nor, what was more important, based on legal foundations as it was before. Although Rugova did not join the growing criticism of Berisha, he, nevertheless, made his visits to Tirana less frequent. Rugova’s cautious withdrawal coincided with Berisha’s rapprochement with Demaci, the unpredictable rival of the moderate Kosovar leader. The outbreak of the Zajedno protests in Belgrade was the signal for the Albanian president to start a propaganda onslaught on what he called Rugova’s passive policy. The pro-Berisha press hailed the “heroic Belgrade students” and criticized the “peace of the graves” that reigned in Prishtina. In December 1996, Rugova had his last meeting with Berisha, and in the communique released from the President’s Office on this occasion the phrase about the “unity of views of the two presidents” was missing. At the same time, in a special statement the U.S. State Department, beside voicing support for Zajedno, backed up Rugova’s peaceful policy. It is highly probable that Washington had interpreted Berisha’s calls for the radicalization of the political movement of the Albanians of Kosovo as an attempt of the Albanian president to exploit the situation in Kosova to prop up his regime in Tirana.

The honeymoon between Berisha and Rugova comes to an end only a few months before Albania plunged into anarchy in the spring 1997. One day prior to Berisha’s being re-elected president, with the state of emergency being enforced throughout the country, Rugova joined the international community calling for new elections in Albania. So Berisha was deprived of the only telegram of congratulation he was waiting for: that of Rugova. At the same time the disenchanted Rugova made the surprising statement that “of all Albanian leaders, Ramiz Alia is the one who has done more for Kosovo”.

Ibrahim Rugova returned to Tirana when Nano’s socialists had taken over. According to some sources, during his first and last meeting with the representatives of the new Tirana Government in September 1997, there was talk also about an eventual meeting between Nano and Milosevic in Crete. Rugova did not object to the meeting, but was not over-enthusiastic about it, either. However, immediately after the Crete meeting took place, Rugova was quick to denounce it as a move detrimental to the cause of Kosovo. Crete marks the break in Rugova’s delicate relations with official Tirana and the return to his first love: Berisha.

Throughout one year of Nano’s grip on power, his contacts with Rugova were almost nonexistent and the two leaders did not spare pungent remarks to each other address. Rugova went as far as to say that “we want good relations with Albania as it is a neighbor coutnry (?)”, whereas Nano said that at best “Rugova represents his own self”. The extravagant vocabulary of the Albanian prime minister and the picture of his shaking hands with Milosevic bring relations between Tirana and Prishtina to their lowest ebb.

However, while they have no relations with Rugova, Nano and his cabinet establish close ties with the UCK, which buys arms, trains its men and opens a sort of Ho Chi Minh trail from Albania to Kosova. It was not casual that during a short stay in Tirana on his journey to Prishtina Richard Holbrook asked his Albanian interlocutor: Have you any message to send to Prishtina?

Some days thereafter, during a meeting with President Clinton at the White House, Rugova attacks Fatos Nano and expresses himself in favor of Berisha¾s return to power in Albania. Last autumn some newspapers in Tirana and Prishtina published the minutes of the Rugova-Clinton talks, a text, which the White House neither acknowledged nor disavowed.

In autumn 1998 Majko replaces Nano, but although the patriotic overtones rise in Tirana, Rugova continues to stand aloof. Prior to the Rambouillet meeting the Albanian capital is visited by Qose, Demaci, Bukoshi, and Surroi, but not Rugova. In the course of the Rambouillet meeting, finding herself hard put with the Kosovar delegation, Albright calls for the help of the Albanian minister of foreign affairs, Paskal Milo, who meets all the members of the Kosovar delegation with the exception of Rugova. Later on, on its flight back from Paris, the French military airplane is refused landing in Prishtina and has to make a forced landing at Tirana airport. Albanian President Meidani comes out to receive the delegation. All its members disembark, with the exception of Rugova. The French ambassador to Tirana boards the plane and entreats Rugova to come down. Rugova yields to his entreaties halfheartedly.

… and the Reality

This entire rather long chronicle will perhaps partially explain why an eventual visit of Rugova to Tirana will be embarrassing both for him and official Tirana. Much water has flown since the April 1st meeting this year, when the media of the whole world had pictures of Rugova shaking hands with Milosevic. “If the news is true, then this is an irresponsible act”, was Prime Minister’s Majko official comment.

Many in Tirana thought that after his handshake with Milosevic and especially after his inexplicable smile in front of the cameras Rugova was a politically dead man. This was perhaps one of the reasons why Tirana was quick to take the side of the newly created Thaci government. Rugova’s arrival in Rome, however, complicated matters further.

Paradoxically now hawkish Berisha stands in the same trench with dovish Rugova, whereas the meek lambs of Majko’s socialist government openly support the radicals of the Kosova Liberation Army (UCK). Rugova has not yet had a phone conversation with the Albanian president or prime minister (if, for other reasons, to thank them for their reception of “his people” in Albania), but he did call former president Berisha, probably to thank him for not leaving him in the lurch in the difficult days he had gone through.

Foreign minister Milo, the only Albanian high official who met Rugova in Rome, invited him to Albania and got from Rugova only the reply that he would come to Albania soon, after he had paid a visit to Macedonia (?!). In the meantime, during Scalfaro’s visit to Tirana, the Albanian Government did not fail to express openly to the Italian Government its displeasure over the fact that Rome did not inform Tirana beforehand about Rugova’s emergence in the West. By recognizing the Thaci government only a few days after Rugova had reached “international waters” Tirana replied to Rugova’s rebuff with a challenge that makes a compromise even more difficult.

Whereas the West managed to achieve an equilibrium of some sort in its relations with the different Kosovar political and military factors (for instance, Robin Cook received Rugova at the Foreign Office and immediately afterwards had a phone conversation with Thaci in Kosova), balance is an instrument which is not easily found in Albania¾s Balkan bargaining. Both sides, Rugova and official Tirana, are in an awkward situation and do not know how to get out of it.

Apparently Rugova’s embarrassment, however, goes beyond his delicate relations with Tirana. It seems that the Kosovar leader is somewhat apprehensive over confronting his own people. The words he chooses to express the plight of Kosova, if we are allowed to borrow the expression of a Tirana journalist, are more similar to those used by the moderate Russian mediator Chernomyrdin. Moreover, in all his interviews Rugova has gone to great lengths to avoid mentioning Milosevic by name, vaguely mentioning some Belgrade extremists, a term Milosevic may or may not fit into.

On the other hand, a Rugova’s eventual visit to Tirana would lead to his inevitable confrontation with the Kosova Liberation Army, which has established its offices in the Albanian capital. If Rugova meets his detractors, the question arises whether this would lead to a compromise or a final break. If he comes to Tirana and does not meet the UCK representatives, this would be an intolerable gesture of defiance on his part and might make matters worse for the Kosovar leader.

However, no matter how it is being justified, the delay of Rugova¾s journey to Tirana would have a political cost which would eventually become too high for the moderate leader of the Kosova Albanians to endure, as he no longer has the monopoly of Kosovar politics.

However, Rugova seems to be in the good graces of the West, which still needs the Kosovar moderate leader. Not only because he possesses a much clearer and more legitimate mandate of representation than the other members of the Kosovar delegation at the Rambouillet talks, but also because he would be more inclined to eventual compromises in the days to come. Likewise, Rugova, who still enjoys popularity among the Kosovars, is also needed as a counterweight to the revolutionization of the UCK, or its shadowy part, which some European countries see with fear and suspicion.

Ironically the West is trying to reward the Kosovar Gandhi precisely at a time when war could not be avoided. War broke out, among other causes, also because the West did not recompense in time Rugova’s peaceful policy of which one cannot say that it was a mistake or a failure. It was only a spent course. In this case, however, I have some doubts about the propriety of the expression: “Better late than never”.

Remzi Lani (AIM)