From the Mandate of the Specialist Chambers to the Imperative of Universal, Impartial and Non-Selective Justice

ABSTRACT

The statement by the Ambassador of the European Union to Kosovo, Dirk Schuebel, concerning the obligation to respect the current mandate of the Kosovo Specialist Chambers, brings renewed attention to an issue of particular legal, constitutional and political significance: the relationship between the Republic of Kosovo’s international obligations, state sovereignty, judicial independence and the right of democratic institutions to exercise their constitutional powers.

This analysis examines the diplomatic dimension of the Ambassador’s statement, the principles of international law, the standards of fair trial and the imperative of addressing all war crimes and post-war crimes without ethnic, political or institutional distinction.

Particular attention is given to the Military Technical Agreement of Kumanovo, the withdrawal of Serbian forces from Kosovo, international documentation concerning the continuation of Serbian intelligence activities after 1999, as well as the unresolved killings, abductions and other crimes committed during the post-war period.

The central argument of this paper is that compliance with international obligations and the demand for universal justice are not conflicting objectives. On the contrary, they should constitute two pillars of the same legal and democratic order. Justice loses its credibility when it is perceived or implemented through unequal standards, while sustainable peace cannot be achieved without fully addressing the past and establishing individual responsibility for every crime.

Keywords: Kosovo, sovereignty, European Union, Specialist Chambers, international justice, selective justice, KLA, Kumanovo Agreement, Serbian intelligence services, war crimes, international responsibility.

INTRODUCTION

Statements made by diplomatic representatives of the European Union concerning matters related to Kosovo’s constitutional order, the functioning of its institutions and its judicial system carry particular political and institutional significance. They cannot be considered outside the context of relations between Kosovo and the European Union, the country’s international obligations and the principles governing diplomatic relations.

In this context, the statement by EU Ambassador Dirk Schuebel that the current mandate of the Specialist Chambers must be respected in accordance with international obligations, judicial independence and the rule of law deserves broader legal and political examination.

The issue is not limited to compliance with the mandate of a judicial institution. It raises a more fundamental question: how should Kosovo’s international obligations be reconciled with its constitutional sovereignty, the powers of its democratic institutions and the requirement for equal justice?

At the same time, the debate surrounding the Specialist Chambers cannot be separated from Kosovo’s broader historical context. Crimes committed during the war, systematic violence against the Albanian population, the withdrawal of Serbian forces, post-war developments, political killings and unresolved cases constitute inseparable elements of the same fundamental issue: the right of victims to justice and the obligation of institutions to establish accountability.

Therefore, this analysis does not seek to challenge the principle of individual criminal responsibility, nor does it advocate immunity for any individual or particular category of persons. Rather, it seeks to examine whether international justice standards are being applied equally and whether accountability for crimes committed in Kosovo is being addressed in its full historical and legal context.

I. THE EU AMBASSADOR’S STATEMENT, KOSOVO’S SOVEREIGNTY AND THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-INTERFERENCE IN INTERNAL AFFAIRS

The statement by European Union Ambassador Dirk Schuebel that the current mandate of the Kosovo Specialist Chambers must be respected in accordance with international obligations, judicial independence and the rule of law represents an important official position of the EU concerning institutional and legal developments in Kosovo.¹

From a diplomatic perspective, the expression of such positions forms part of the functions of diplomatic representatives and the relations between the European Union and Kosovo’s institutions. Nevertheless, when diplomatic statements directly concern matters that are the subject of constitutional and parliamentary debate, the boundary between diplomatic communication and respect for the receiving state’s decision-making autonomy must be carefully examined.

The Republic of Kosovo is an independent and sovereign state, possessing its own constitutional order, democratic institutions and powers defined by its Constitution. Relations with the European Union and obligations arising from international agreements do not deprive Kosovo of its institutional sovereignty.

In this regard, the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, in Article 41, stipulates that persons enjoying diplomatic privileges and immunities have a duty to respect the laws and regulations of the receiving state and not to interfere in its internal affairs.²

This principle constitutes a fundamental element of diplomatic law and ethics. It requires relations between states to be conducted on the basis of mutual respect, sovereign equality and non-interference in matters falling within the competence of another state’s institutions.

However, a distinction must be made between expressing a diplomatic position and legally prohibited interference in internal affairs. Not every public statement by an ambassador constitutes a violation of Article 41. The legal assessment depends on the content, context and manner in which influence is exercised.

In the present case, the issue deserving consideration is whether the Ambassador’s expressed position, beyond recalling international obligations, risks being perceived as establishing in advance the limits of legislative and constitutional debate in Kosovo.

1. Constitutional Sovereignty and the Powers of the Assembly

The Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo establishes the separation of powers, the functioning of democratic institutions and the powers of the Assembly as the country’s highest legislative body.

Within this framework, the Assembly has the right to consider, propose and adopt legislative amendments within the limits of the Constitution and Kosovo’s international obligations.

This right does not constitute authorisation to interfere with judicial decision-making, nor does it permit legislation to be amended for the purpose of influencing the outcome of a specific criminal proceeding. Nevertheless, it includes the right to engage in democratic debate concerning the institutional architecture, jurisdiction, powers and functioning of judicial institutions.

In this context, the initiative to amend Law No. 05/L-053 on the Specialist Chambers and Specialist Prosecutor’s Office must be examined in accordance with the Constitution, Constitutional Amendment No. 24 and the relevant international agreements.³

Consequently, neither the adoption of a legislative initiative can automatically be considered lawful merely because it has been undertaken by the Assembly, nor can its opposition by an international institution replace constitutional review.

2. International Obligations and the Partnership with the European Union

Kosovo is obliged to respect the international agreements and commitments it has undertaken.

This obligation forms part of the state’s international credibility and its relations with strategic partners.

Nevertheless, international partnership should not be interpreted as a relinquishment of the right to parliamentary debate, constitutional oversight and democratic scrutiny of institutions.

Compliance with international obligations and the exercise of constitutional sovereignty must operate in a complementary manner.

International cooperation should be based on mutual respect, rather than creating the perception that the institutions of a sovereign state lack the space to debate their own constitutional and legal affairs.

This is the standard that should also characterise relations between Kosovo and the European Union.

II. THE PRINCIPLE OF UNIVERSALITY OF JUSTICE: JUSTICE MUST BE IMPARTIAL AND NON-SELECTIVE

International justice is founded upon universal principles, among which equality before the law, individual criminal responsibility, the presumption of innocence, the right to a fair trial and the prohibition of discrimination are of fundamental importance.

No individual may be exempted from criminal responsibility because of their political or military position or national affiliation. At the same time, no person may be considered responsible solely because of their membership in an organisation, army or political group.

These principles are fundamental to the legitimacy of every judicial proceeding.

The European Convention on Human Rights, in Article 6, guarantees the right to a fair trial, while Article 14 prohibits discrimination in the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Convention.⁴

1. Individual Responsibility, Not Collective Responsibility

One of the greatest risks in the legal treatment of armed conflicts is the transformation of individual criminal responsibility into collective responsibility.

The Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) was an armed organisation that emerged in the context of repression, state violence and the struggle for Kosovo’s liberation.

The historical assessment of the KLA’s struggle, its liberation character and the right of the people of Kosovo to freedom and self-determination cannot be replaced by the criminal assessment of specific acts committed by individuals.

A judicial proceeding may establish the criminal responsibility of accused persons, but it cannot transform an entire people, a liberation struggle or all members of an organisation into subjects of collective responsibility.

This distinction is particularly important for preserving legal accuracy and historical truth.

2. The Specialist Chambers and the Limits of Their Jurisdiction

The Kosovo Specialist Chambers were established in 2015 on the basis of Constitutional Amendment No. 24 and Law No. 05/L-053.

Their establishment was linked to Kosovo’s international obligations and to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe’s report, Doc. 12462, issued in 2011.³

The jurisdiction of these Chambers is defined by law and relates to specific persons, offences and periods of time.

An important distinction must therefore be made: the fact that the Specialist Chambers have jurisdiction over certain matters concerning allegations of crimes committed by KLA members does not mean that they constitute an institution with general jurisdiction over all crimes committed in Kosovo.

They were not established to prosecute every person responsible for the war in Kosovo, nor to replace all other mechanisms of international justice.

This makes the question of how responsibility for crimes committed by Serbian forces and for crimes committed after the end of the war is addressed even more important.

3. Crimes Committed by Serbian Forces and the Responsibility of Senior Officials

The documentation of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia demonstrates that a coordinated campaign of violence, expulsions and crimes against the Albanian civilian population of Kosovo took place during 1999.

In the case of Prosecutor v. Šainović et al., on 23 January 2014, the Appeals Chamber of the Hague Tribunal upheld the convictions of four senior Serbian political, military and police officials for crimes committed in Kosovo.⁵

This judgment is particularly significant because it establishes the criminal responsibility of individuals from the highest levels of Serbian state structures for crimes committed against the Albanian population.

Therefore, the treatment of war crimes in Kosovo cannot be limited exclusively to examining allegations against members of the KLA.

Justice must also encompass the responsibility of political, military and police structures that organised, ordered, facilitated or failed to prevent crimes against civilians.

4. The Problem of Selective Justice

Concerns regarding selective justice must be examined in relation to the scale of crimes, the number of victims, institutional responsibility and the concrete results of investigations and prosecutions.

It would be inaccurate to interpret every difference in jurisdiction or in the number of judicial proceedings automatically as discrimination. Nevertheless, the existence of different jurisdictional limits does not eliminate the obligation of other institutions to investigate crimes that fall outside the jurisdiction of a particular court.

This is where the essence of the criticism lies: when criminal responsibility for one category of crimes is pursued intensively, while other serious crimes remain unresolved or are not effectively prosecuted, a serious problem of public confidence in the justice system emerges.

For victims and their families, justice cannot be a matter of political interests, ethnic affiliation or institutional priorities.

Justice cannot operate according to two different standards. It must be the same for Albanian, Serbian, Roma and all other victims, and criminal responsibility must be established on the basis of evidence and law.

III. THE KUMANOVO AGREEMENT, THE WITHDRAWAL OF SERBIAN FORCES AND ACCOUNTABILITY FOR POST-WAR CRIMES

The Military Technical Agreement of Kumanovo, signed on 9 June 1999 between representatives of NATO and the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Serbia, constitutes one of the fundamental documents marking the end of the war in Kosovo.

The Agreement established the withdrawal of all Federal Republic of Yugoslavia forces from the territory of Kosovo, the cessation of hostilities and the deployment of an international security presence.⁶

The withdrawal was carried out in phases and was completed on 20 June 1999, according to the report of the United Nations Secretary-General.⁷

1. Obligations Established by the Kumanovo Agreement

The Agreement established the obligation to withdraw all Yugoslav military and police forces from Kosovo.

It also provided KFOR with the authority and capacity to undertake the necessary measures to establish and maintain a secure environment for all the people of Kosovo.

This provision was particularly important because security was not supposed to be limited merely to the cessation of hostilities. It was also intended to include the protection of the civilian population, the prevention of violence and the guarantee of freedom of movement.

2. Resolution 1244 and International Responsibility

United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244, adopted on 10 June 1999, established the international framework for the deployment of an international civil presence and an international security presence in Kosovo.⁸

On the basis of this resolution, KFOR and the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) were established.

KFOR assumed responsibility for establishing a secure environment, while UNMIK was responsible for civil administration and the development of provisional institutions.

In this context, international responsibility for Kosovo’s security was of exceptional importance.

Following the withdrawal of Serbian forces, Kosovo faced a new reality: weak institutions, the absence of consolidated security mechanisms, mass population displacement and continuing inter-ethnic and political tensions.

3. The Obligation to Protect All Citizens

The protection of the civilian population was a fundamental obligation of the international presence.

This included the protection of Albanians, Serbs, Roma and all other communities.

Crimes committed against members of any community required investigation and accountability.

Nevertheless, this obligation must also be examined in relation to crimes committed against Albanians after the end of the war, including political killings, abductions and attacks against former KLA members.

International responsibility did not end with the departure of Serbian forces. It continued for as long as international institutions retained authority and responsibility for Kosovo’s security and administration.

The end of the war did not bring the obligation to deliver justice to an end. On the contrary, it created a new obligation: to ensure that no citizen became a victim of violence, retaliation, political elimination or the activities of illegal structures.

IV. COVERT STRUCTURES OF SERBIAN INTELLIGENCE SERVICES AFTER THE WITHDRAWAL FROM KOSOVO – INTELLIGENCE NETWORKS, INFILTRATION AND THE CONTINUATION OF COVERT ACTIVITIES

One dimension that frequently receives insufficient attention in analyses of post-war Kosovo is the continuation of Serbian intelligence activities following the withdrawal of regular military and police forces in June 1999.

The withdrawal of uniformed forces did not necessarily mean the termination of all intelligence networks, operational contacts and mechanisms of influence that had been established during previous years.

To understand this dimension, it is necessary to examine the structure of the Serbian security apparatus and its activities in Kosovo before, during and after the war.

1. The Serbian Intelligence and Security Apparatus

During the years of conflict, various security structures of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Serbia operated in Kosovo.

The principal institutions included:

The Serbian State Security Service, known as SDB/RDB, operating within the Ministry of Internal Affairs.
The military counterintelligence service of the Yugoslav Army.
Military intelligence structures.
Police units and other security mechanisms that had operated in Kosovo.
The Human Rights Watch report Under Orders: War Crimes in Kosovo, published on 26 October 2001, describes the structure of the Serbian security apparatus, the organisation of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the network of the State Security Service in Kosovo.⁹

The report refers to regional service centres in Pristina, Prizren and Gjilan, as well as the network of operatives and informants established before and during the war.

This is important for understanding that the Serbian security apparatus did not operate solely through uniformed units, but also through intelligence structures and local contacts.

2. Residual Covert Structures – The Phenomenon Known as “Spavači”

In intelligence terminology, the Serbian term “spavači” refers to agents or covert elements that remain inactive for certain periods, while the expression “spavaća pozadina” refers to covert support networks.

In the context of post-war Kosovo, this phenomenon should be examined in relation to Serbian intelligence structures, local networks and individuals who continued to appear in international documentation after the withdrawal of regular forces.

Concrete evidence concerning this issue can be found in the International Crisis Group report Violence in Kosovo: Who’s Killing Whom?, dated 2 November 1999.¹⁰

According to this report, slightly more than one month after the withdrawal of Serbian forces, KFOR had expelled six Serbian nationals identified as members of Belgrade’s intelligence services, who were in possession of signalling equipment.

The report also addresses concerns regarding the infiltration of Serbian intelligence elements into northern Kosovo, the collection of information concerning NATO’s presence and activities that could influence the destabilisation of the security situation.

These findings are particularly significant because they demonstrate that, even after the withdrawal of regular forces, activities linked to Belgrade’s intelligence services remained a concrete concern for international security mechanisms.

3. Intelligence Gathering and the Preservation of Influence in Kosovo

One of the important dimensions of intelligence activity was the preservation of knowledge concerning political, institutional and security developments in Kosovo.

International reports from the period document the existence of Serbian intelligence networks and concerns regarding the continuation of their influence.

In this context, particular importance was attached to:

Information concerning political and institutional developments.
Monitoring changes within security structures.
Following developments involving former KLA structures.
Gathering information concerning NATO’s presence and activities.
Maintaining previous contacts and local connections on the ground.
These elements should be analysed within the framework of Belgrade’s efforts to preserve its political and intelligence influence over developments in Kosovo after 1999.

4. Local Networks and the Continuity of Intelligence Structures

The Human Rights Watch report demonstrates that the Serbian State Security Service had used an extensive network of informants and organised its activities through regional centres.

This documentation is important because it identifies an intelligence system that did not depend exclusively on the physical presence of official service personnel.

During the post-war period, the continuation of previous contacts, local connections and the influence of Serbian security structures constituted important issues for Kosovo’s stability.

Particular attention should also be given to northern Kosovo, especially Mitrovica and the surrounding municipalities, where political and security developments after 1999 were characterised by continuing tensions and considerable influence from Belgrade.

5. Infiltration and Influence on the Security Situation

The November 1999 International Crisis Group report documents the concerns of international mechanisms regarding the infiltration of elements linked to Serbian services and activities that could affect Kosovo’s security.

These developments must be analysed within the broader context of the post-war security situation.

At a time when local institutions had not yet developed consolidated capacities and KFOR and UNMIK maintained primary responsibility for security and administration, the activities of covert intelligence networks represented a serious institutional challenge.

This issue also assumes significance in relation to Serbia’s efforts to preserve its influence over political and security developments, particularly in areas where parallel structures and direct links with Belgrade’s institutions continued to exist.

6. Opening the Archives and Establishing the Activities of Serbian Intelligence Services

One of the most important issues in establishing the truth about the past is access to the archives of Serbian intelligence services.

Documentation belonging to intelligence and military counterintelligence services could be particularly important in understanding the organisation, activities and continuity of security structures in Kosovo.

For this reason, opening the relevant archives and ensuring international cooperation in obtaining historical documentation should form part of efforts to establish the truth about the past.

This is not merely a matter of Kosovo’s historical interest. It is an issue of justice, transparency and international accountability.

The withdrawal of regular Serbian forces from Kosovo in June 1999 must not be confused with the termination of every form of intelligence activity and influence exercised by Belgrade’s security structures. International documentation demonstrates that such activities remained a concrete concern even after the establishment of the international presence.

V. VIOLENCE, INSECURITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY AFTER THE END OF THE WAR

The end of the war in June 1999 did not mark the end of violence in Kosovo.

On the contrary, the immediate post-war period was characterised by a serious security situation involving killings, abductions, population displacement, attacks on property and continuing political and inter-ethnic tensions.

This period requires particular analysis because responsibility for security and public order rested with international mechanisms.

1. Violence Following KFOR’s Deployment

The Human Rights Watch report Under Orders: War Crimes in Kosovo documents a considerable number of abuses and crimes committed after 12 June 1999.

The report addresses killings, abductions, torture, expulsions and violence against non-Albanian communities. It also documents violence against Albanians accused of collaborating with Serbian authorities and attacks of a political nature.¹¹

These findings demonstrate the complexity of the post-war security situation.

Nevertheless, the analysis of this period should not be limited to only one dimension of violence. It must also encompass the killings of former KLA members, political representatives and other individuals, some of which were suspected of having political motives.

2. The Responsibility of UNMIK and KFOR

Resolution 1244 assigned the international presence significant responsibilities for the security and administration of Kosovo.

Within this framework, KFOR was responsible for establishing a secure environment, while UNMIK was tasked with developing mechanisms for public order, policing and justice.

Nevertheless, reports by international organisations identified considerable difficulties in guaranteeing security, a lack of police capacity and delays in establishing a functioning justice system.

Human Rights Watch assessed that the international community’s slow response to post-war violence contributed to the creation of an atmosphere of impunity.¹²

This issue deserves particular examination because international responsibility for security was not merely political or symbolic; it was directly connected to the mandates of the institutions deployed in Kosovo.

3. The Absence of Justice and Problems with Investigations

One of the most serious problems during the post-war period was the difficulty of identifying and prosecuting those responsible for crimes.

In many cases, investigations failed to produce concrete results, while the victims’ families remained without answers.

The absence of a consolidated justice system, difficulties in gathering evidence, the intimidation of witnesses and insufficient institutional capacities contributed to the continuation of impunity.

This situation affected all communities, but it also had particular consequences for Albanians who became victims of political killings and post-war violence.

4. Historical and Institutional Responsibility

An assessment of the post-war period requires that responsibility for security not be separated from responsibility for justice.

International institutions were not only obliged to prevent violence, but also to establish mechanisms capable of ensuring effective investigations and the punishment of perpetrators.

For this reason, the analysis of this period must also address the question of how effective international mechanisms were in investigating political killings, abductions and other serious crimes.

Peace cannot be measured solely by the absence of armed conflict. It must also be measured by citizens’ security, the functioning of justice and the ability of institutions to protect human life and dignity.

VI. POLITICAL KILLINGS AND THE KILLINGS OF FORMER KLA MEMBERS AFTER THE END OF THE WAR

One of the most sensitive and still unresolved chapters in Kosovo’s post-war history concerns the wave of political killings, assassination attempts, abductions and murders targeting former commanders, soldiers and members of the Kosovo Liberation Army.

Following the end of the war in June 1999, Kosovo entered a complex period of political and institutional transformation. While local institutions were still in the process of consolidation, primary responsibility for security and public order rested with the international presence, within the framework established by United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244.

Nevertheless, the post-war period was characterised by a considerable number of killings, assassination attempts and acts of violence affecting political figures, institutional representatives, former commanders, former KLA members and other individuals involved in Kosovo’s public life.

1. The Scale of Political Violence and the Killings of Former KLA Members

The Human Rights Watch report Under Orders: War Crimes in Kosovo (2001) documents that the period following the end of the war was characterised by killings of political figures, attacks against former KLA members and assaults targeting individuals involved in Kosovo’s political life.

A specific figure cited in this report, based on reporting by The New York Times, indicates that 23 KLA members were killed between June 1999 and May 2000. This figure provides a documented indication of the scale of violence against former members of the organisation during the first months following the end of the war.¹³

Nevertheless, this does not represent the total number of political killings, nor the total number of all former KLA members killed during the post-war period.

International reports from this period also identify the continuation of attacks against representatives of political parties, former wartime structures and individuals with influence in public life.

The scale of this phenomenon requires a comprehensive historical, institutional and legal examination, including all documented cases and the status of the respective investigations.

2. Political Killings and the Climate of Insecurity

The killings of individuals involved in Kosovo’s political and institutional life created an atmosphere of insecurity and affected the process of democratic consolidation.

Violence against political representatives, activists and former KLA members cannot be separated from the context of the post-war transition, when Kosovo was moving from wartime organisation towards political pluralism and the establishment of democratic institutions.

During this period, killings and assassination attempts targeting individuals with political and institutional influence created an atmosphere of fear and insecurity, undermining citizens’ confidence in law enforcement and justice mechanisms.

Every killing involving suspected political motives should have been treated with the utmost seriousness by the responsible security and judicial mechanisms.

3. The Responsibility of International Mechanisms

During the post-war period, KFOR and UNMIK had internationally defined responsibilities for security, public order and the administration of Kosovo.

Therefore, an assessment of this period cannot be limited solely to identifying crimes and potential perpetrators. It must also include an examination of the effectiveness of international mechanisms in preventing violence, investigating killings and identifying those responsible.

The absence of comprehensive results in a number of cases and the continuation of impunity have left profound consequences for the confidence of victims’ families in justice institutions.

This raises an important issue of institutional responsibility: to what extent were the powers and international mechanisms available at the time actually used to establish the truth about these crimes?

4. The Security Dimension and the Activities of Serbian Structures

In assessing post-war violence, the broader security context must also be taken into account, including international documentation concerning the continuation of Serbian intelligence activities following the withdrawal of regular forces.

International reports from the period identified concrete concerns regarding the presence of elements linked to Belgrade’s intelligence services, their networks of contacts and their efforts to preserve influence over developments in Kosovo.

These findings constitute an important part of the historical and security context in which many post-war crimes occurred.

For this reason, documentation belonging to Serbian intelligence services, security archives and international cooperation in obtaining historical evidence should have particular importance in efforts to establish the truth about unresolved cases.

5. The Right of Families to Truth and Justice

More than two decades later, the families of many victims continue to seek answers concerning the circumstances of the killings, the perpetrators and the motives behind these crimes.

The right to truth is an important component of transitional justice and of the obligation of institutions to investigate serious human rights violations.

The clarification of these cases must not depend on the political, national or institutional affiliation of the victims.

Every unresolved case deserves a professional investigation, while every family has the right to demand justice and institutional accountability.

The history of post-war Kosovo cannot be considered fully documented as long as a considerable number of political killings and killings of former KLA members remain without definitive answers.

Justice for the victims of the war cannot be separated from justice for the victims of the post-war period. Both form part of the same historical, legal and moral responsibility.

CONCLUSIONS

The statement by the Ambassador of the European Union to Kosovo, Dirk Schuebel, concerning respect for the current mandate of the Specialist Chambers must be examined within the framework of the relationship between international obligations, constitutional sovereignty and the principles of justice.

Kosovo is obliged to respect its international commitments and guarantee judicial independence. However, this obligation cannot be interpreted as restricting the right of democratic institutions to engage in constitutional and legal debate within the scope of their powers.

At the same time, no criticism of the Specialist Chambers should turn into a denial of individual criminal responsibility. Responsibility must be established on the basis of evidence, fair trial standards and applicable law.

Nevertheless, justice for Kosovo cannot be understood solely through one judicial proceeding or through only one category of crimes.

It must encompass the entire history of the conflict and its consequences: crimes committed by Serbian forces against the Albanian population, individual responsibility for crimes committed by KLA members, post-war violence, political killings and unresolved cases.

The judgments of the Hague Tribunal against senior Serbian officials for crimes committed in Kosovo demonstrate that criminal responsibility must also extend to the highest levels of state structures whenever the evidence establishes such responsibility.

Likewise, international documentation concerning the activities of Serbian intelligence structures after 1999 and reports of post-war political killings demonstrate the importance of adopting a broader approach to establishing the truth about the past.

In this regard, opening the archives of Serbian intelligence services, investigating unresolved cases and ensuring international cooperation in documenting crimes must form part of the agenda for justice and sustainable reconciliation.

The European Union and international partners have an important role to play in this process. However, their credibility cannot be built solely upon the demand that Kosovo respect its own obligations. It must also rest upon the application of equal standards of justice, the equal treatment of victims and support for efforts to establish the truth about all crimes.

Kosovo is not seeking privileges or immunity for anyone. It is not demanding that crimes committed by KLA members remain uninvestigated. It is demanding that no crime be excluded from the attention of justice and that no victim be treated as less important because of their national or political affiliation.

This is the distinction between genuine justice and justice perceived as selective.

POSITION
WE STAND FOR JUSTICE, BUT NOT FOR SELECTIVE JUSTICE

We stand for the investigation and punishment of every crime, regardless of who committed it. We stand for individual responsibility, not collective guilt. We stand for judicial independence, but also for transparency, accountability and the equal application of international standards.

Justice cannot be demanded exclusively for the victims of one side while crimes committed against other victims remain without answers.

Unconditional respect for international institutions cannot be demanded without simultaneously requiring those institutions to account for their results, limitations and responsibilities.

Sustainable peace cannot be built upon forgetfulness, unequal treatment of victims or the absence of accountability for unresolved crimes.

Justice is neither an instrument of politics nor a tool of diplomatic pressure. It is a universal principle that must be applied without distinction and without double standards.

Kosovo has the right to demand full, impartial and universal justice. This is not a demand directed against the European Union or its international partners. It is a demand for respect for the very legal and democratic values upon which they themselves base their legitimacy.

FOOTNOTES

1. European External Action Service (EEAS), Press Remarks by the EU Ambassador in Kosovo, Dirk Schuebel, at a Joint Press Conference on the European Commission’s 2026 Kosovo Report, 4 November 2026.

2. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, 18 April 1961, Article 41.

3. Republic of Kosovo, Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo, 2008, Amendment No. 24 and Article 162; Law No. 05/L-053 on the Specialist Chambers and Specialist Prosecutor’s Office, 2015; Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, Doc. 12462, 7 January 2011.

4. Council of Europe, European Convention on Human Rights, Rome, 4 November 1950, Articles 6 and 14.

5. International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), Prosecutor v. Nikola Šainović et al., Case No. IT-05-87-A, Appeals Judgment, 23 January 2014.

6. NATO and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Military Technical Agreement, Kumanovo, 9 June 1999.

7. United Nations Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo, S/1999/779, 12 July 1999.

8. United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1244 (1999), S/RES/1244, 10 June 1999.

9. Human Rights Watch, Under Orders: War Crimes in Kosovo, 26 October 2001, Chapter III, “Forces of the Conflict”.

10. International Crisis Group, Violence in Kosovo: Who’s Killing Whom?, Balkans Report No. 78, 2 November 1999, p. 8.

11. Human Rights Watch, Under Orders: War Crimes in Kosovo, 26 October 2001, Chapter XVII, “Abuses After June 12, 1999”.

12. Human Rights Watch, Under Orders: War Crimes in Kosovo, 26 October 2001, section addressing the international community’s response to post-war violence.

13. Human Rights Watch, Under Orders: War Crimes in Kosovo, 26 October 2001, Chapter XVII, pp. 468–469. Referring to reporting by The New York Times, the report indicates that 23 KLA members were killed between June 1999 and May 2000.

II. BIBLIOGRAPHY

A. Legal and International Documents

1. Republic of Kosovo, Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo, 2008, as amended.

2. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, 18 April 1961.

3. European Convention on Human Rights, 4 November 1950.

4. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 9 December 1948.

5. United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1244 (1999), S/RES/1244, 10 June 1999.

6. NATO and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Military Technical Agreement, Kumanovo, 9 June 1999.

7. Republic of Kosovo, Law No. 05/L-053 on the Specialist Chambers and Specialist Prosecutor’s Office, 2015.

8. Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, Inhuman Treatment of People and Illicit Trafficking in Human Organs in Kosovo, Doc. 12462, 7 January 2011.

B. Judicial Decisions

1. International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), Prosecutor v. Nikola Šainović et al., Case No. IT-05-87-A, Appeals Judgment, 23 January 2014.

2. Kosovo Specialist Chambers, Specialist Prosecutor v. Hashim Thaçi et al., Case No. KSC-BC-2020-06, Trial Judgment, 16 September 2026.

C. International Reports and Studies

1. Human Rights Watch, Under Orders: War Crimes in Kosovo, 26 October 2001.

2. International Crisis Group, Violence in Kosovo: Who’s Killing Whom?, Balkans Report No. 78, 2 November 1999.

3. International Crisis Group, What Happened to the KLA?, Balkans Report No. 88, 3 March 2000.

4. OSCE/ODIHR, Kosovo/Kosova: As Seen, As Told, 1999.

5. United Nations Secretary-General, Report on the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo, S/1999/779, 12 July 1999.

6. European External Action Service (EEAS), Press Remarks by EU Ambassador Dirk Schuebel on the European Commission’s 2026 Kosovo Report, 4 November 2026.

Prishtina,05.11.2026