Ballinat e botimit në greqisht të elaboratit famëkeq të Vaso Çubriloviçit

“The Expulsion of the Albanians” is a memorandum prepared and written by the noted Bosnian Serb scholar and political figure Vaso Cubrilovic (1897-1990). As a student in 1914, Cubrilovic had participated in the assassination in Sarajevo of Archduke Ferdinand of Austria-Hungary, the event which precipitated the First World War. Between the two wars, he was a professor at the Faculty of Arts in Belgrade. A leading member of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Art, Cubrilovic also held several ministerial portfolios after World War II. Among his writings is the monograph “Istorija politicke misle u Srbiji XIX veka” (Belgrade, 1958) (History of Political Thought in Serbia in the 19th Century).

The Expulsion of the Albanians

The problem of the Albanians in the life of our country and people did not arise yesterday. It played a significant role in our lives in the Middle Ages. Still, its importance only became decisive towards the end of the seventeenth Century, at a time when the masses of the Serbian people were displaced northwards out of their former ancestral territory of Raška, supplanted by Albanian highlanders. Gradually, the latter came down from their mountains to the fertile plains of Metohija and Kosovo. Spreading northwards, they continued in the direction of southern and western Morava, and, crossing the Shar mountains, descended into Polog, from where they headed towards the Vardar. Thus, by the nineteenth Century, the Albanian triangle was formed, a wedge that, with its Debar-Rogozna axis in the rear, penetrated as far into our territories as Niš and separated our ancient land of Rashka from Macedonia and the Vardar Valley.
In the nineteenth Century, this wedge, inhabited by wild Albanian elements, prevented the maintenance of any strong cultural, educational and economic links between our northern and southern territories. It was also the main reason why, until 1878, Serbia was unable to establish and maintain continuous links with Macedonia through Vranja and the Black Mountain of Skopje, and thus to exercise its cultural and political influence on the Vardar Valley, to the extent that one would have expected in view of conducive geographical factors and historical traditions in these regions. Although the Bulgarians began their life as a nation later than the Serbs, they initially had greater success. It explains why there are permanent settlements of southern Slavs from Vidin in the North to Ohrid in the South. Serbia began to slice off pieces of this Albanian wedge as early as the first uprising by expelling the northernmost Albanian settlers from Jagodina.
Thanks to the wide-ranging national plans of Jovan Ristic, Serbia sliced off another piece of this wedge with the annexation of Toplica and Kosanica. At that time, the regions between Jastrebac and southern Morava were radically cleared of Albanians. From 1918 onwards, it was the task of our present state to suppress what remained of the Albanian triangle, but it did not succeed. Though there are several reasons for this, we shall examine only the most important of them.
1. The fundamental mistake made by the authorities in charge at that time was that, forgetting where they were, they wanted to solve all the major ethnic problems of the troubled and bloody Balkans by Western methods. Turkey brought to the Balkans the customs of the Sheriat, according to which victory in war and the occupation of a country conferred the right on the victor to dispose of the lives and property of the subjected inhabitants. Even the Balkan Christians learned from the Turks that not only state power and domination, but also home and property could be won and lost by the sword. The concept of land ownership in the Balkans was softened somewhat by laws, ordinances, and international agreements introduced under pressure from Europe; however, it has, to a large extent, remained a primary instrument of leverage for Turkey and the Balkan states to this day. We need not evoke the distant past. It is sufficient to refer to a few cases which have taken place in recent times: the transfer of Greeks from Asia Minor to Greece and of Turks from Greece to Asia Minor, or the recent expulsion of Turks from Bulgaria and Romania to Turkey.
While all the Balkan states, since 1912, have resolved or are on the verge of resolving their problems with national minorities through mass population transfers, we have adhered to the slow and cumbersome strategy of gradual colonization. The result has been negative, as evident from the statistics of the eighteen districts which make up the Albanian triangle. These figures show that the natural growth of the Albanian population in these regions is still greater than the total increase in our population from both natural growth and new settlers (from 1921 to 1931, the Albanian population increased by 68,060, while the Serbs showed an increase of 58,745, i.e. a difference of 9,315 in favour of the Albanians). Considering the intractable nature of the Albanians, the pronounced increase in their numbers, and the ever-increasing difficulties of colonization, these factors will eventually call into question even the few successes we have achieved in our colonization efforts since 1918.
2. Even the strategy of gradual colonization was not correctly applied. Worse still, in a matter of such importance, there was no specific state plan for every government and regime to adhere to and implement. Work was intermittent, in fits and starts, with each new minister undoing what his predecessor had done and himself creating nothing solid. Laws and regulations were amended, but, weak as they were, they were never implemented. Some individuals, especially deputies from other regions who could not secure a mandate at home, would go south and court the non-national elements to gain a mandate there, thus sacrificing primary national and state interests. The colonization apparatus was extremely costly, inflated, and populated by individuals who were not only incompetent but also frequently lacking scruples.
Their activities are indeed a topic in themselves. Finally, one need only total up the vast sums this state has invested in colonization and divide them by the number of families settled to prove how costly every new household established since the war has been, regardless of whether or not this expenditure was met by the settlers themselves or by the state. Likewise, it would be interesting to compare the amounts paid out for personal spending and those for materials needed for colonization. In the past, Serbia went about this matter quite differently. Karageorge, during the first uprising, as well as Miloš, Mihajlo and Jovan Ristic had no special ministry of land reform, no general land inspectors, or costly apparatus, and still, they managed to purge Serbia of foreign elements and populate it with our own people who felled the endless forests of Shumadia (Šumadija), transforming them from the wild state they were once in to the fertile Shumadia we know today.
3. Even those few thousand families who were settled after the war did not remain where they were initially located. There was more success in Kosovo, especially in the Lab/Llap valley, where the Toplicans penetrated on their own accord from North to South. Our oldest and most stable settlements were established with elements from various Serbian regions. In Drenica and Metohija, we had no success at all. Colonization should never be carried out with Montenegrins alone. We do not think they are suitable as colonists due to their pastoral indolence. It applies only to the first generation. The second generation is quite different, more active and more practical. The village of Petrovo, located in Miroc, north of the Danube, and considered the most advanced village in Krajina, is inhabited exclusively by Montenegrins.
In Serbia today, there are thousands of other flourishing towns, especially in Toplica and Kosanica, which were established by first-generation Montenegrins who mixed with more advanced elements. The foregoing consideration, nonetheless, still applies in Metohija, where, since the settlers are on their own ancestral lands, old customs still abound. A visit to any coffee house in Peja/Pec is sufficient proof. It is why our colonization has had so little success throughout Metohija. It must be admitted, on the other hand, that these colonies were poorly situated on barren, scrub-covered land and were almost totally lacking in basic agricultural equipment. These people should have been given more assistance than other colonists because they were among the poorest elements of Montenegro.
4. Without doubt, the leading cause for the lack of success in our colonization of these regions was that the best land remained in the hands of the Albanians. The only possible means for our mass colonization of these regions to succeed is for us to take the land away from them. It could have been achieved easily during the rebellion after the war, when the insurgents were active, by expelling part of the Albanian population to Albania, by refusing to legalize their usurpations, and by buying up their pastureland. Here, we must refer once again to the gross error committed in our post-war strategy, specifically the issue of the right to own land.
Instead of taking advantage of the strategy used by the Albanians themselves for ownership of the land they usurped (scarcely any of them had deeds issued by the Turks, and those who did, got them only for land purchased), we not only legalized all these usurpations to the detriment of our state and nation, but worse still, we accustomed the Albanians to western European attitudes to private property. Previously, they could not have understood such concepts. In this way, we ourselves handed them a weapon with which to defend themselves, keeping the best land for themselves and rendering impossible the nationalization of a region of supreme importance to us.
It is apparent from the above that our colonization strategy in the South has not yielded the results which ought to have been achieved and which now impose themselves upon us as a primary necessity of the state. We are not criticizing this strategy merely for the sake of criticism, but rather to identify, based on our experience, the most effective way to solve this problem.

The Problem of Colonization of the Southern Regions

Reading the first part of this paper and comprehending the problem of colonization in the South, one realizes immediately that the primary issue at stake is the regions north and South of the Shar Mountains. It is no coincidence. The wedge of Albanians on both sides of the Shar range is of great national and strategic significance to our state. We have already mentioned the way the population structure came into existence in these regions and the importance of these areas for links to the lands of the Vardar Valley, which are firmly within the limits of our ancient territories. The strength of Serbian expansion ever since the foundation of the first Serbian state in the ninth Century has lain in the continuity of both this expansion and the expansion of ancient Rashka/Raška in all directions, including southwards. However, this continuity has been disrupted by the Albanians. Until the ancient link between Serbia and Montenegro, on the one hand, and Macedonia, on the other, is re-established along the entire line from the River Drin to southern Morava, we will not be secure in the possession of our territories. From an ethnic point of view, the Macedonians will only unite with us if they receive proper ethnic support from their Serbian motherland, something which they have lacked to this day. It can only be achieved through the destruction of the Albanian wedge.
From a military and strategic perspective, the Albanian wedge occupies one of the most vital points in our country, the starting point from which major Balkan rivers flow to the Adriatic Sea, the Black Sea, and the Aegean. Possession of this strategic point determines, to a large degree, the fate of the central Balkans, and in particular, the fate of the main line of Balkan communications from the Morava to the Vardar. It is no coincidence that many battles of decisive importance to the destiny of the Balkans were fought here (Nemanja against the Greeks, the Serbs against the Turks in 1389, Hunyadi against the Turks in 1446). In the twentieth Century, only a country inhabited by its own people can be confident of its security. It is therefore imperative that we not allow such strategic points to be held by hostile and alien elements. It is all the more true in this case, as the component in question has the support of a nation-state of the same racial background. Today, this state is powerless, but even as such, it has become a base for Italian imperialism, which aims to use the country as a means of penetrating the heart of our nation. Our people, who are willing and able to defend their land and country, are the most reliable element in the fight against such penetration.
Except for this block of eighteen districts, the Albanians and other national minorities in different parts of the South are scattered and, therefore, constitute less of a threat to the life of our nation and state. Nationalizing the regions around the Shar mountains would mean that we can stifle irredentism once and for all and ensure our control over these territories forever.
Colonization from the North should be kept to a minimum in the regions inhabited by the Macedonians. Here, land is scarce, and for this reason, the Macedonians would resist an influx of settlers from the North, all the more so because they would regard this influx as a sign of mistrust on our part. As such, even such a minimal colonization would do us more harm than good. If we do send people down there, to the region south of the Black Mountain of Skopje, they should be people from Vranje and Leskovac, who are closer in mentality and culture to the Macedonians. By no means should we send people from the Dinaric region because their irritable and uncontrolled temperaments would only arouse the hostility of the local population. We repeat that this problem will only be solved when our colonies advancing from the North through Kosovo and Metohija in the direction of the Shar mountains and Polog have reached Macedonian settlements.
The problem of the Sandjak of Novi Pazar is being resolved and no longer plays the same role it did in the life of our country before 1912. Let it suffice to mention that with the elimination of the Albanians, the last link between our Moslems in Bosnia and Novi Pazar and the rest of the Moslem world will have been cut. They are becoming a religious minority, the only Moslem minority in the Balkans, and this fact will accelerate their assimilation.
Montenegro has become a serious problem recently. This barren land cannot sustain the population, which, despite resettlement, increased by 16% from 1912 to 1931. These impulsive, pastoral people have contributed many essential characteristics to our race over the centuries. Channelled in the right direction, their energy will not be destructive and could, if directed towards the southeast, be employed for the common good of the country.

Summing up

The Albanians cannot be dispelled by means of gradual colonization alone. They are the only people who, over the last millennium, managed not only to resist the nucleus of our state, Rashka and Zeta, but also to harm us by pushing our ethnic borders northwards and eastwards. When in the last millennium our ethnic borders were shifted up to Subotica in the North and to the Kupa River in the northwest, the Albanians drove us out of the Shkodra (Scutari) region, out of the former capital of Bodin, and out of Metohija and Kosovo. The only way to cope with them is through the brute force of an organized state, in which we have always been superior to them. If, since 1912, we have had no success in the struggle against them, we have only ourselves to blame, since we have not utilized this force as we should have. There is no possibility for us to assimilate the Albanians. On the contrary, because their roots are in Albania, their national awareness has been awakened, and if we do not settle the score with them once and for all. For all, within 20-30 years, we shall have to cope with a terrible irredentism, the signs of which are already apparent and will inevitably put all our southern territories in jeopardy.

The International Problems of Colonization

Suppose we proceed on the assumption that the gradual displacement of the Albanians through gradual colonization is ineffective. In that case, we are then left with only one course – that of mass resettlement. In this connection, we must consider two countries: Albania and Turkey.
With its sparse population, its many undrained swamps and uncultivated valleys, Albania would have no difficulty admitting some hundred thousand Albanians from our country. With its vast and uninhabited frontiers in Asia Minor and Kurdistan, modern Turkey, for its part, offers seemingly unlimited opportunities for internal colonization. Despite efforts by Kemal Atatürk, the Turks have not yet been able to fill the vacuum created by the evacuation of the Greeks from Asia Minor to Greece and of some Kurds to Persia. Hence, the most extraordinary possibilities lie in sending the bulk of our displaced Albanians there.
Firstly, I stress that we must not limit ourselves to diplomatic démarches with the Ankara government, but must employ all available means to convince Tirana to accept some of our displaced people as well. I believe that we will encounter difficulties in Tirana because Italy will likely attempt to hinder the process. Be that as it may, money plays a significant role in Tirana. In negotiations on this issue, the Albanian government should be informed that we will not stop until we achieve a final solution to this question. At the same time, we should tell them about the available colonization subsidies, stressing that no controls will be exercised over them. Eventually, notables in Tirana will recognize the material benefits involved and be persuaded, through secret channels, not to raise any objections to the entire operation.
We have heard that Turkey has agreed, initially, to accept about 200,000 of our displaced persons on condition that they are Albanians, something which is most advantageous to us. We must comply with Turkey’s wish immediately and sign a convention for the resettlement of the Albanian population as soon as possible. Regarding the resettlement of this Albanian population, we must examine the conventions that Turkey has recently signed with Greece, Romania, and Bulgaria, paying particular attention to two key aspects: Turkey should accept the largest possible contingent and receive maximum financial assistance for the swift organization of transportation facilities. As is inevitable in such cases, this problem will no doubt give rise to some international concern. Over the last hundred years, whenever such actions have been carried out in the Balkans, there has always been some power which has protested because the action did not conform to its interests. In the present case, Albania and Italy may make some protest.
We have already pointed out that attempts should be made to conclude an agreement with Albania on this matter and, failing this, we should at least secure its silence on the evacuation of the Albanians to Turkey. We repeat that skilful action and money properly used in Tirana may be decisive in this matter. World opinion, primarily financed by Italy, will be slightly upset. Nevertheless, the world today has grown used to things much worse than this and is so preoccupied with its day-to-day problems that this issue should not be a cause for concern. At a time when Germany can expel tens of thousands of Jews and Russia can shift millions of people from one part of the continent to another, the evacuation of a few hundred thousand Albanians will not set off a world war. Be that as it may, decision-makers should know ahead of time what they want and pursue those goals unfalteringly, regardless of possible international repercussions.
Italy, no doubt, will raise more difficulties, but at present the country is excessively preoccupied by problems of its own in Abyssinia. Austria, for its part, will not dare to go very far in its opposition. To tell the truth, the greatest danger lies in the possibility that our great allies, France and Britain, may interfere. These two countries must be given the calm and resolute reply that the security of the Morava-Vardar line is in their interests. That this is so was confirmed during the last great war, and that line can only be made more secure, for them and for us, if, in ethnic terms, we completely dominate the region around the Shar mountains and Kosovo.

The Mode of Evacuation

As we have already stressed, the mass evacuation of the Albanians from their triangle is the only practical course we can take. To relocate a whole people, the first prerequisite is the creation of a suitable psychosis. It can be done in various ways.
It is well known that the Muslim masses are generally readily influenced by religion and are prone to superstition and fanaticism. Therefore, we must first win over the clergy and men of influence through money and threats, for them to give their support to the evacuation of the Albanians. Agitators, especially those from Turkey, must be identified as quickly as possible to facilitate the evacuation, if Turkey will provide them for us. They must laud the beauties of the new territories in Turkey and the easy and pleasant life to be had there, and must kindle religious fanaticism among the masses and awaken pride in the Turkish state. Our press can be of colossal assistance by describing how gently the evacuation of the Turks from Dobruja took place and how easily they settled in their new regions. Such information would create the requisite predisposition for the masses of Albanians to be willing to leave.
Another means would be coercion by the state apparatus. The law must be enforced to the letter to make staying intolerable for the Albanians: fines, imprisonment, the ruthless application of all police regulations, such as the prohibition on smuggling, cutting forests, damaging agriculture, leaving dogs unchained, compulsory labour, and any other measure that an experienced police force can devise. From the economic aspect, this should include the refusal to recognize old land deeds. The work of the land registry should be accompanied from the start by the ruthless collection of taxes and the payment of all private and public debts, the requisitioning of all public and municipal pasture land, the cancellation of concessions, the withdrawal of permits to exercise an occupation, dismissal from government, private and municipal offices etc., all of which will speed up the process of evacuation.
Health measures should include the strict enforcement of all regulations, even within homes, the removal of encircling walls and high hedges around private houses, and the rigorous implementation of veterinary measures, which will result in a ban on selling livestock on the market, among other measures. These measures can be applied practically and effectively. The Albanians are very touchy when it comes to religion. They must therefore be harassed on this account as well. This can be achieved through the ill-treatment of their clergy, the demolition of their cemeteries, the prohibition of polygamy, and especially the inflexible application of the regulation compelling girls to attend elementary school, wherever they are.
Private initiative can also play a significant role in this direction. We should distribute weapons to our colonists as needed. The old form of Chetnik action should be organized and secretly assisted. In particular, a mass migration of Montenegrins should be launched from the mountain pastures to create a large-scale conflict with the Albanians in Metohija. This conflict should be prepared for and encouraged by people we can trust. It can be easily achieved since the Albanians have, indeed, revolted. The entire affair can be presented as a conflict between clans, and if necessary, it can be attributed to economic reasons. Finally, local riots can be incited. These will be bloodily suppressed by the most effective means, albeit by colonists from the Montenegrin clans and the Chetniks, rather than by the army.
There remains one more method Serbia employed with significant practical effect after 1878, that is, secretly razing Albanian villages and urban settlements to the ground.

The Organization of the Evacuation

From the attached map (1), it is apparent which regions must be cleared. They are: Upper Dibër / Debar, Lower Polog, Upper Polog, the Shar mountains, Drenica, Peja / Pec, Istog / Istok, Vuçitërna / Vucitrn, Stavica, Llap / Lab, Graçanica / Gracanica, Nerodimja / Nerodimje, Gjakova / Djakovica, Podgor, Gora (Dragash), Lugu i Drinit / Podrimje, Gjilan / Gnjilane and Kaçanik / Kacanik. Of these regions, which together form the Albanian wedge, the most important for us at the moment are: Peja / Pec, Gjakova / Djakovica, Lugu i Drinit / Podrimje, Gora (Dragash), Podgor, Shar, Istog / Istok and Drenica, all to the North of the Shar mountains, Upper Dibër / Debar and the two Pologs to the South, and the Shar mountains themselves. These are border regions that must be cleared of Albanians at any cost. The internal areas, such as Kaçanik / Kacanik, Gjilan / Gnjilane, Nerodimja / Nerodimje, Graçanica / Gracanica, Llap / Lab, and Vuçitërna / Vucitrn, etc., must be weakened if possible, particularly Kaçanik / Kacanik and Llap / Lab, while the others should be gradually and systematically colonized over a period of decades.
The methods mentioned above should be used primarily in the border regions, if we wish to clear them of Albanians. During resettlement, the following must be kept in mind:
Firstly, resettlement should begin in the villages and then proceed to the towns. The villages are the more dangerous, being more compact. Then, the mistake of removing only the poor should be avoided. The middle and upper classes form the backbone of every nation. They, too, must therefore be persecuted and driven out. Lacking the support which their economically independent compatriots have, people with low incomes will then submit more quickly. This question is of great importance, and I emphasize this because one of the leading causes for the failure of our colonization in the South has been that the poor were expelled while the rich remained. We were, thus, no better off because we gained minimal land for the settlement of our colonists. To create a proper psychosis for resettlement, everything possible must be done to evacuate whole villages, or at least whole families. It must be prevented at all costs that part of a family is left behind while other members remain. Our state is willing to spend millions not to make life easier for the Albanians, but to get rid of as many of them as possible. For this reason, those who remain behind must be barred absolutely from purchasing property from those evacuated. It should be taken into consideration when evacuating individuals and entire villages, if we want to make the relocation process as easy as possible for them.
Once they agree to move, they should be given all the assistance they require. Administrative formalities should be simplified, their property paid for on the spot, travel documents issued without the least formality, and they should be assisted in getting to the nearest railway station. Trains should be made available for them as far as Salonika, and from there, they should be transported immediately by ship to Asia. The journey must be easy, comfortable and cheap. Train travel should perhaps be made free of charge, and displaced persons should be assisted with food, because whether or not large masses of people can be evacuated depends mainly on the transportation conditions. Fear of difficulties en route is a significant factor in keeping people from departing. This fear must be overcome by resolving all the problems associated with the journey quickly and efficiently. Particular care must therefore be taken to ensure that these people have the fewest possible difficulties en route. Simple people often struggle to find their way, so it would be advisable for major travel enterprises to study transportation systems and adapt them accordingly. The displaced person must pass from hand to hand without feeling that his movement is a burden. Only in this way will it be possible to create a proper flow of Albanian evacuees and empty the South of them.

Depopulating and Repopulating Regions

The problem of establishing colonies in depopulated regions is no less critical than the expulsion of the Albanians.
The first question to arise is: Who is to be settled here? The most natural thing would be to populate these regions with elements of our people from destitute areas: Montenegrins in the first place, but also Herzegovinians, Licanas and Krajšniks. The Montenegrins are the most suitable candidates for several reasons, and Metohija, Drenica, and Kosovo are the most natural places for them to migrate from their impoverished mountain homelands. The increase in population in Montenegro has led to widespread poverty, which, in recent times, has given rise to ongoing social and political unrest. It is unfavourable for our control of the country and poses a significant danger to the maintenance of law and order in the future. Providing them with maize and pensions is ineffective. The only solution is to send them down into the fertile regions of Metohija, Drenica and Kosovo.
The Montenegrins will prove to be excellent instruments in overcoming the Albanians, as they share a similar mentality and temperament. They must be settled initially in the regions north of the Shar mountains. Along with them, however, people from Lican, Krajšnica, Serbia, Cacak, Užice, and Toplica should also be brought in as colonists. It is necessary in order to create improved working habits and organization among the Montenegrins, and to break down the nomadic group mentality and the spirit of collectivity that characterizes the highlanders, by mixing and intermarrying. In this way, a new type of Montenegrin can be created with a less local and more broad-minded, Serbian outlook.
Suitable conditions should be created for southern Serbian emigrants living in the regions south of the Shar mountains so that they can take possession of the fertile lands. They are honest, hardworking people who would be grateful to the state all their lives if better living conditions could be created for them in rural areas. The rural southern Serbs have a right to expect more care and attention than we are currently giving them. Settling these poor people in Polog (Upper and Lower) and Dibër/Debar, and allocating pasture land to them instead of to the Albanians, will give them a sense of belonging to the state, and they will be more willing, accordingly, to defend its borders.
Colonization south of the Šar Mountains and the Black Mountain of Skopje can also be achieved with Serbs from Vranje, Leskovac, Pirot, and Vlasenica, especially those from destitute mountain villages. We repeat that the Dinarics should not be allowed to expand south of the line formed by the Black Mountain of Skopje and the Shar mountain range.
It is essential to avoid bureaucracy and petty formalities in the settlement of villages cleared of Albanians. The first and immediate step is to give the colonists deeds to the land they are settling. One of the main reasons for the failure of our colonization so far has been that settlers did not feel secure on their land because they did not receive a title to it and were thus left to the mercy of unscrupulous petty officials and local politicians. The peasant only feels secure if he knows that no one can take his land away from him. Such a guarantee should therefore be provided from the start.
On the other hand, it is dangerous to give colonists full and unrestricted ownership of land. In principle, homesteaders are carrying out a mission on behalf of the state and the nation, and they must fulfill their mission if they are to retain their homesteads. They should not, therefore, have full and unrestricted ownership of the property in question. Because there are so many different types of people among them, from village workers who have lost their inner attachment to the land to herders who will have to adapt to agriculture, their attachment to the land must have the force of law. It will ensure that they begin to love their new home and region, and if they fail in this, their children will at least.
For this reason, colonists should be prevented by law from obtaining full ownership of the land for any period of less than thirty years, even though the deeds are handed out at the start. According to the laws of our country, women do not enjoy the right to inherit property. To avoid the fragmentation of property into tiny parcels, women must be excluded from inheriting such homesteads, except in cases where the colonist has no male descendant and plans to bring a bridegroom into the household. The properties that have been given to the colonists so far have been small. Bearing in mind the intensive farming methods employed here, the decline in prices for farm products, and the large size of families among the colonists, 5-10 hectares of land is insufficient to ensure the economic survival of the settlers.
It is better to settle a region with a smaller number of colonists, giving them better conditions for development, than with many rural semi-proletarians. It is another cause of failure in our colonization of the South and the North to date. Individuals suitable for settling land under harsh conditions are rare among other nations. The few successes we have achieved in our colonization strategy have been the result of our race’s aptitude for colonization. It is only our peasants who can survive when shifted from one environment to another and put up against scrubland which has never been used for agriculture. Think of how they would flourish if the state were to carry out its duties and provide them with everything they needed.
On 10 February 1865, the government of Prince Mihajlo passed a law on the ‘Settlement of Foreigners in Serbia’. Under this law, the Serbian government granted poor colonists from neighbouring regions 1.8 hectares of arable land, 1.8 hectares of non-arable land, a house, a yoke of oxen, a cart, two goats or sheep, a sow, necessary tools and 120 grosh in cash. In addition to this, they were, of course, given maize for food to last them until the first harvest. One plough was provided for every two families. These fixed and movable assets were granted to the settlers for a term of fifteen years, without the right to sell or otherwise dispose of them. At the end of this period, the assets became their property. For the first five years, the settlers were exempt from all kinds of government taxes. For ten years, they were also exempt from universal compulsory service in the regular army and for five years from service in the people’s militia. The response from all sides was such that, within a few months, all homesteads were taken, and we were immediately able to colonize more land than we had been able to do for several years since the war. Had the government granted such favourable conditions for settlers after 1918, our situation in the Vojvodina and in southern Serbia would be much different. It is how we must act in the future if we want to achieve success.
There are also lessons to be learned from the colonization of Toplica and Kosanica after 1878, when the Albanians were expelled from this region. The method of colonization was established in the law of 3 January 1880. On 3 February of the same year, the People’s Council approved an amendment to the law on agrarian relations under the motto “land for the peasants.” Without hesitation, Serbia applied for its first foreign loan to pay Turkey for the lands it had taken. It did not establish a ministry of agrarian reform or a costly apparatus to address the problem of colonization. Everything was managed practically. The police distributed land to all those who were willing to work it. People came from Montenegro, Sjenica, Vranje, Kosovo, Peja/Pec, and other areas, and, in a matter of thirty years, Toplica and Kosanica, once Albanian regions of ill repute, gave Serbia the finest regiment of the 1912-1918 wars, the Second Iron Regiment. During that period, Toplica and Kosanica paid and repaid, with the blood of their sons, for the millions of dinars which Serbia had spent to settle these regions.
It is only by following this example and understanding what is required, sparing neither money nor blood, that our nation can create a new Toplica out of Kosovo and Metohija.
Hence, if we want the colonists to remain where they are, we must assure them of all necessary means of livelihood within the first few years and severely prohibit any speculation with the houses and property of the displaced Albanians. The government must reserve for itself the unlimited right to dispose of the fixed and movable assets of the Albanians. It must settle its own colonists there as soon as the Albanians have departed. It is essential because it is rare for an entire village to leave at once. The first to be settled in these villages should be the Montenegrins, who, with their arrogant, irascible and merciless behaviour, will drive the remaining Albanians away. Then, colonists from other regions can be brought in. This paper focuses on the colonization of southern Serbia. The problem of Vojvodina, particularly with the Hungarian triangle in Backa, i.e., Senta, Kula, and Backa Topola, is, however, no less important to us. Destroying this triangle in the Vojvodina is indeed just as essential as eradicating the Albanian wedge around the Shar mountains. Tens of thousands of Hungarian farmhands have been left behind since the breakup of the large estates in Vojvodina and constitute a significant burden for Serbian and German farm owners in the region. Some of these Hungarian and even German farm labourers and small proprietors could be sent to the South because in Backa, on the border with Hungary, they constitute a real threat, all the more so since the Serbs in Backa represent only 25% of the population.
In southern Serbia, they would become good citizens by defending their property against Albania and would integrate well into the local population. What is more important, since they are more progressive and of a higher cultural level than our peasants, they would provide a good example of advanced farming methods. We stress, however, that Serbs from the Vojvodina should not be sent to the South for colonization. There is still much land to be colonized in the Vojvodina, so they should be given homesteads there instead. It is worth noting that during the 1928-1929 period, a widespread movement occurred among Hungarians and Germans from Vojvodina to relocate to southern Serbia. Lacking understanding of the problem, our authorities opposed such a movement and stifled it. Any such reaction on the part of the government today must be countered, and the public must be instructed to encourage the movement of Hungarians and Germans from the Vojvodina, especially those from Backa, to the South.

The Colonization Apparatus

Of particular importance for addressing the question under discussion is the existence of a proper apparatus to direct the entire business. The poor work done by the apparatus implementing our colonization strategy in the past was primarily responsible for its failures. To avoid making the same mistakes in the future, we must undertake a reorganization.
No other question demands such continuity of implementation as our colonization strategy. We have pointed out that one of the main reasons for the failure of our colonies, both in the North and in the South, has been the inconsistent work and vacillations in policy implemented after each change of government. If this is to be avoided in the future, our colonization strategy must be entrusted to the army’s General Staff. Why? Simply for reasons of defence. Our army is intent on settling our people along the borders, especially in the most delicate sectors. To this end, it will do its utmost to secure these borders with the firmest possible settlements. The General Staff, as the primary institution for the defence of our national interests, can make a significant contribution to our overall colonization strategy. It will know very well how to protect the colonization strategy from the private interference of those who want to use it for their own personal interests, as well as from external influence. Another important fact is that it would be easier for the General Staff to convince the responsible bodies of the importance of the issue and to force them to take effective action. The People’s Council would have more faith in it and would grant the necessary credits to it more readily than to others.
The General Staff would oversee all work through a government Commission for Colonization. This Commission would be quite independent, though under the direct supervision of the Chief of General Staff and would have under its control all bodies involved in our colonization strategy. Representatives from various interested ministries, national associations, technical organizations, and scholarly institutions would also be invited to participate in this Commission.
The greatest mistake in our past colonization strategy was that untrained and incompetent bureaucrats had the primary say and dealt with problems only superficially and in a piecemeal manner. We need only recall the settlement campaign carried out by volunteers from Hungary in Ovce Polje and Kadrifikovo, or the emigrants from Istria and Gorica who settled around Demir Kapija. The matter requires close collaboration between the government, private initiative and scholarly institutions. Private initiative can take many forms. The People’s Defence, the Sokolašas, the Chetnik Associations, and others could take action against the Albanians, which would be inappropriate for the state to do. Associations of agronomists, doctors, engineers, and cooperatives could provide valuable assistance, along with their technical advisors, in solving the numerous problems that will arise during the colonization campaign. Cultural associations, such as Prosveta in Sarajevo, Matica Srpska in Novi Sad, and the St. Sava Associations in Belgrade, among others, also play a role.
Undoubtedly, our institutions of higher learning have begun to lose the prestige they once had. The main reason for this is that the university and the Academy of Sciences are becoming increasingly estranged from real life and neglecting their primary duty in a relatively backward country such as ours: i.e., paving the way for the application of the scientific achievements of the twentieth Century. Many billions would have been saved in this country, many mistakes would have been avoided in our government policy, including our colonization policy, had the problems been studied seriously and objectively in advance by competent scholars before they were taken up for solution. Our policy of colonization, likewise, would have taken on a more serious approach, greater continuity, and practical application had the opinions of experts and scholars been sought in advance.
To begin with, the Royal Serbian Academy of Sciences and the University of Belgrade should take the initiative to organize comprehensive scientific studies on the entire problem of colonization in our country. It would be feasible for many reasons. At the university, we have experts on every aspect of colonization. Teachers and academicians at the university are independent scholars, less subject to external political influence. They already have good experience in such fields, and their scholarly work is a guarantee of objectivity. They should, therefore, take the initiative of setting up a colonization institute, the task of which would be to pursue colonization studies. The government, for its part, should detach from the ministries all the institutions which have been engaged with this problem so far, and create a special institution, “The Colonization Inspection Office.”
The Colonization Inspection Office would be headed by an Inspector General, appointed by decree on the recommendation of the Minister of War, the Chief of General Staff and the Prime Minister. All work at the Colonization Institute and in the Colonization Inspection Office would be carried out under the orders of and under the supervision of the government Commission for Colonization. At the same time, the Inspector General would be answerable to the Chief of General Staff. The colonization institute would be divided into the following sections:
1) organization,
2) education and culture,
3) finance,
4) agriculture,
5) construction,
6) hygiene, etc.
In agreement with scientific, cultural, and educational associations and institutions, as well as national associations, the various sections would study problems of colonization and prepare directives, thereby supplying our colonization policy with solid, scientifically elaborated material on which decisions could be based. Managing this institute would involve people from the Commission for Colonization, including representatives of the ministries mentioned above, the university, the Academy of Sciences, and private, national, educational, and cultural organizations, who would be elected or appointed to this body. In this case, care must be taken not to bring in people just for honour’s sake, but only men who love and are dedicated to this great work.
The heads and employees of the institute should be selected through a competitive process. The institute would then supply the Colonization Inspection Office with scientifically elaborated material for the implementation of our colonization strategy. Should differences of opinion arise between the Colonization Inspection Office and the institute over some fundamental question, the Chief of General Staff would have the final say.
The Colonization Inspection Office must have its executive headquarters in the territory and be composed of individuals selected for their enthusiasm and readiness for this work, regardless of whether they are employed by the government. They should, if possible, be chosen through a competitive process and appointed upon the proposal of the Chief of General Staff. Compromised or incompetent cadres must be dismissed. During its work, the Colonization Inspection Office and its organs must strive to minimize bureaucracy as much as possible, while keeping in mind one primary objective: the swift expulsion of the Albanians and their resettlement by our colonists.
The police apparatus will play a vital role in this action. It is, therefore, essential to select and second the most energetic and honest officers. Their transfer should be made with the approval of the Chief of General Staff, and for such a difficult job, they should be paid from secret loans. Stern measures must be taken against anyone who commits the slightest infraction. An extraordinary commissar, who would execute the orders of the state colonization inspector, must be appointed for the whole of the eighteen districts mentioned. The prefects of the districts must be given special, wide-ranging powers for their work, as well as appropriate instructions. Our political parties should be told curtly that rivalry among them during elections in these districts is strictly prohibited, and that any interference by deputies in favour of the Albanians is categorically forbidden.
The government institute and the Colonization Inspection Office would elaborate on the technical details for organizing the evacuation of the Albanians and the relocation of our settlers. It would not be a bad idea, perhaps, if another private organization were to be established, in addition to these two official institutions. This private organization would be formed from existing associations and would have the task of assisting in the implementation of our colonization strategy through private initiative. It would be best if the federation of our cultural and education associations could take over this job. Its main task would be to coordinate and assist in promoting links between them and the colonization institute.

Funding

Whenever our colonization strategy has been criticized for its lack of success, its defenders have always excused themselves by citing the inadequacy of the funds allocated by the government for this work. We do not deny that this has been the case to some extent. It must be said, however, that more has been spent in our country on the maintenance of this apparatus and its irrational activities than on the work of colonization itself. Nevertheless, even though the government has not provided as much as it should have, it must be understood that every country has its own primary and secondary interests to look after. Among a country’s primary interests, without doubt, is the maintenance of its rule in regions of national insecurity by colonizing such areas with its own people. All other commitments are of secondary importance to this. Funds can and must be found to deal with this problem. We have already mentioned the colonization of Toplica and Kosanica, as well as the benefits derived from this. Given that the small Kingdom of Serbia did not hesitate to make significant financial sacrifices, indeed did not even hesitate as a free and independent kingdom to seek its first loan for colonization, is it possible that our present-day Yugoslavia would be unable to do the same? It can and must. That it lacks the means to do so is not true.
Let us calculate approximately how much it would cost our country to expel 200,000 Albanians and settle the region with as significant a number of our people.
The resettlement of 40,000 Albanian families, with an average family size of five members and an average expenditure of 15,000 dinars per family, would cost a total of 600 million dinars. The colonization apparatus for the settling of 40,000 Serbian families might reach a total of 200 million dinars. In any case, the whole operation would not cost more than 800 million dinars. It is because:
1. The evacuated Albanians would leave behind not only land, but also their houses and implements. Thus, not only would most of our colonists be settled in the homes of the Albanians, but, with a bit of assistance in food and livestock, they would soon recover economically and become independent. We stress in this connection that no private speculation with the possessions left behind by the Albanians would be tolerated. The government must take control of these possessions and distribute them to the settlers.
2. Military forces should be employed, where required, during the setting up of new colonies, as was the case with the construction of Sremska Raca and the reconstruction of the villages destroyed by the 1931 earthquake. To this end, the army should be given the right and possibility to set up a kind of compulsory labour service for public projects, just as Stambolisky created the Trudova pronist in Bulgaria and Hitler the Arbeitsdienst in Germany, that is, by calling up reservists or extending the term of military service. It would be especially beneficial for our young people, after completing their training and graduating from university, to be entrusted with such work. Were this to be the case, many of them, by taking part in constructive activities in the public interest, would become more conscious and look at things from a more realistic perspective. Such a scheme could be carried out easily by giving priority in public service employment to those young people who have spent a specific period of time working on behalf of our colonization strategy. It would also help reduce unemployment among our young intelligentsia, which is an increasingly acute social problem in our country.
3. In collaboration with specialized organizations and associations, we must find the cheapest means of clearing the land of scrub, of irrigating farms, of draining swamps, etc., as well as of constructing homes. Private companies should be informed that, since the government assists them with reduced customs and railway tariffs, loans and other means for the procurement of supplies and materials necessary for their work, it also has the right, considering the importance of this action, to insist that such supplies and materials be made available at the lowest possible price. Supplies and materials should be procured by means of cartels, in agreement with which, the government would specify the quantity, quality and cost of the material in question without fictitious deals being involved. Government enterprises, such as the railways and forestry enterprises, as well as Šipad, should be placed at the unrestricted disposal of the government Commission for Colonization.
4. During colonization, the government may grant settlers property on credit or for cash. Many of the settlers will purchase land in the new regions by selling their original property in their place of birth. It will enable the government to recoup a significant portion of the money it has invested. However, we stress that land must only be sold to individuals who provide proof that they will settle on it permanently and cultivate it. Land given on credit must not be too expensive. The interest rate must be minimal, and repayment should be deferred for several years to give the settlers time to establish themselves, i.e., repayment should only begin when the settlers have sufficient economic strength.
Taking this as a basis, the government, which must cover all administrative expenses for these activities from its normal revenues, can procure funds from two sources. One would be the pruning of unnecessary expenditures and expenditures earmarked for other, less urgent sectors. Another possible source of funds would be loans, which could be provided by state banks, either alone or in conjunction with private capital, based on a compulsory domestic credit line. It would be backed up by securities issued by the government, as well as by contributions from the settlers themselves when they become independent.
It might not be a bad idea if the financing and purchasing of land were to be arranged by agricultural banks working in collaboration with cooperatives under the direct supervision and direction of the government Commission for Colonization. However, it is still too early to make any definitive pronouncement on this matter because the conditions under which Turkey will accept the population displaced from our territories are not yet known.
Taken altogether, the sum of a few hundred million dinars is no great expense for the government when compared to the tangible benefits gained from such an action. By securing the most sensitive regions in the South of our country for our own people, we could save the lives of several divisions in case of war. Giving land to several tens of thousands of families from economically weaker regions, such as Montenegro, would, on the one hand, help alleviate the appalling economic suffering of these regions and, on the other hand, create many new jobs during the process of colonization. It would be possible to find employment for 10,000 workers, thus giving a boost to our sluggish economy.
In view of the supreme national, military, strategic and economic significance of this action, it is clearly the duty of the government to sacrifice a few hundred million dinars. At a time when the government can spend one billion dinars on the construction of an international highway from Subotica to Caribrod, the possible benefits of which we shall only enjoy at some time in the distant future, it can and must be in a position to come up with a few hundred million dinars to give us back possession of the cradle of our nation.

Conclusions

In view of all that has been said, it is no coincidence that in our examination of colonization in the South, we hold the view that the only effective means of solving this problem is the mass expulsion of the Albanians. Gradual colonization has had no success in our country, nor in other countries, for that matter. If the state wishes to intervene in favour of its own people in the struggle for land, it can only be successful by acting brutally. Otherwise, the native, who has his roots in his place of birth and is at home there, will always be stronger than the colonist. In our case, we must keep this fact in mind, because we are dealing with a hardy, resilient, and prolific race that the late Cvijic described as being the most expansive in the Balkans.
From 1870 to 1914, Germany spent billions of marks on the gradual colonization of its eastern territories by purchasing land from the Poles; however, the fecundity of Polish women ultimately defeated German organization and financial resources. Thus, Poland regained its Poznan in 1918. Our above-mentioned statistics of the 1921-1931 period show that it was the fecundity of Albanian women which defeated our colonization policy, too. We must draw our conclusions from this, and we must do so promptly while there is still time to rectify the situation.
All of Europe is in a state of turmoil. We do not know what each new day and night will bring. Albanian nationalism is also on the rise in our territories. Should a global conflict or social revolution occur, both of which are possible soon, it would leave the situation as it would jeopardize all our territories in the South. The purpose of this paper is to avert such an occurrence.

Dr Vaso Cubrilovic (signed)

(1)
The author of the memorandum attaches a detailed map of the region to be cleared to the document [editor’s note].

[Taken from Iseljavanje Arnauta. Manuscript in the Institute of Military History of the Yugoslav People’s Army (Vojno Istorijski Institut JNA). Archives of the former Yugoslav Army (Arhiv Bivše Jugoslovenske Vojske), Belgrade, 7 March 1937, No. 2, Fasc. 4, Box 69, 19 pp. Retranslated from the Serbo-Croatian by Robert Elsie, based on an existing English version. First published in R. Elsie, Gathering Clouds: The Roots of Ethnic Cleansing in Kosovo and Macedonia, Dukagjini Balkan Books (Peja 2002), p. 97-130.]