“Two days before the suspension of the Strategic Dialogue, the U.S. Chargé d’Affaires Anu Prattipati warned me that this could happen.” – Nenad Rashiq. According to him, the suspension was triggered above all by the government’s criticism of the Constitutional Court.

I’m afraid Rashiq might be right. The suspension followed the government’s criticism of the Constitutional Court. It appears so, because other sources confirm the same explanation. And let us be clear: criticism is not the same as undermining the Court. In every democracy, courts are sacred in the binding force of their decisions — but they are never beyond question. Criticism is not a privilege of private citizens alone. Institutional leaders share that right — and when the balance of the Republic is at stake, it can even become their duty.

Our American friends know this well. Criticism of courts, whether constitutional or ordinary, is part of democratic life in both Kosovo and the United States. President Trump has frequently and openly criticized American courts — including the U.S. Supreme Court — and such debate is treated as legitimate public discourse. What is accepted as normal in Washington should also be seen as natural in Prishtina.

The Constitutional Court is the guardian of the Republic. But a guardian must remain within the walls it protects. The Constitution guarantees the inclusion of minorities, but it does not create a veto through the back door. Article 81 lists the exact cases where a special majority is required. Outside those cases, the Assembly must function on the principle of majority rule.

We should never lose sight of this: the right of the Kosovo Serb community to have a representative in the Presidency of the Assembly is not the same as a right to block the Constitution of the Assembly itself. I fully uphold, recognize, and support the right of the Kosovo Serb community to that seat, as foreseen in Article 67.4 of the Constitution of Kosovo. But I am equally clear — and we will do everything possible — to resist any attempt to transform that right into a veto power over the life of the Republic.

If the Court fails to distinguish between a procedural complaint and a disguised veto claim, it risks writing into the Constitution what the Constitution itself forbids: the paralysis of the state through minority blockade. To confuse participation with paralysis would be to turn inclusion into its opposite.

Inclusion yes. Paralysis never.

Respect for the Court means expecting it to safeguard the Constitution — not to amend it by judgment. And if the Court crosses that line, criticism is not disloyalty. It is the highest act of constitutional fidelity.

Kadri Kryeziu

Professor of Constitutional Law